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Capital structure decisions in family firms – empirical evidence from a bank-
based economy 





This study examines how family firm characteristics affect capital structure decisions. 
In our analysis we disentangle the influence of three distinct components of a family firm: 
ownership, supervisory and management board activities by the founding family. Thereby, we 
use a unique panel dataset of 660 publicly listed companies (5,135 firm years) in the broadest 
German stock index CDAX from 1995 to 2006. This paper is motivated by hitherto 
inconclusive empirical findings on capital structure decisions in family firms from Anglo-
Saxon countries. We provide new evidence for a bank-based economy. In this sense, 
Germany provides a very fruitful research environment as it (i) traditionally has a bank-based 
financial system and (ii) family firms are considered to be the backbone of the economy.   
   We find that family firms have significantly lower leverage ratios than non-family 
firms, independent of the definition of leverage applied. Among the three dimensions of a 
family firm, management board involvement by the founding family has a consistently 
negative influence on leverage across all our models. In contrast, the influence of ownership 
and supervisory board representation is insignificant in almost all of our models. In line with 
agency theory, we can show that the leverage level is the lowest if the founding family is 
simultaneously a large shareholder with monitoring incentives and involved in firm 
management with convergence-of-interest effects. Finally, we detect that the presence of a 
founder CEO in firm management has a significant negative effect on the leverage ratio. Our 
results prove to be stable against a battery of robustness tests including a matching estimator 
technique to demonstrate causal effects.  
 
 
JEL Classification: G 32, G 34 
 
Keywords: Family firms, family ownership, family management, founder CEO, agency costs, 
capital structure, debt-equity ratio, leverage, corporate governance, risk aversion 
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1 Introduction 
 
The “capital structure puzzle”,
1 i.e. the firm’s choice of an optimal capital structure, 
remains one of the large unresolved issues in the financial economics literature. The origin for 
five decades of capital structure research is provided by Modigliani and Miller (1958). They 
argue that in a neoclassical world capital structure decisions are irrelevant for the market 
value of a firm (MM-theory). However, the MM-theory builds on the restrictive assumptions 
of perfect and complete capital markets with rational investors.  
Consequently, further research subsequently enhanced the field of capital structure 
theory by accounting for several market imperfections. Modigliani and Miller (1963) 
themselves started to extend their MM-theory by introducing taxes and costs of financial 
distress. The static “trade-off theory” of capital structure assumes the existence of a target 
debt ratio where the marginal cost of an additional unit of debt, i.e. the costs of financial 
distress, equal the marginal benefits of an additional unit of debt, i.e. the tax shield. In other 
words, according to this theory management aims to establish an optimal capital structure 
which is determined by a trade-off between the costs and benefits of borrowing debt. In 
contrast, the second major capital structure theory is based on a dynamic perspective of 
investment opportunities and information asymmetries (Donaldson 1961, Myers 1984, Myers 
and Majluf 1984). The “pecking order theory” of capital structure assumes that firms prefer to 
finance growth opportunities with internal funds, debt, preferred equity and common equity, 
in that order. Behind the pecking order theory is the rationale that information asymmetries 
between informed firm insiders and uninformed outside investors lead to a mispricing of 
equity issues. Hence, the decisions of the management are driven by the desire to minimize 
transaction costs. Despite the dominance of those two paradigms in the discussion of capital 
structure theory, several authors have proposed further determinants of capital structure 
decisions: Among them are signalling aspects (Ross 1977, Leland and Pyle 1977), risk 
aversion (Fama 1980, Masulis 1988, Berger et al. 1997), corporate control considerations 
(Harris and Raviv 1988, Stulz 1988 and more recently Ellul 2008), market timing issues 
(Baker and Wurgler 2002) and firm history (Kayhan and Titman 2007).
2  
In this paper, we focus on another major determinant for capital structure decisions: 
agency costs (Jensen and Meckling 1976, Easterbrook 1984, Jensen 1986). In particular, we 
compare two distinct groups of firms that are considered to be unequal in terms of agency 
costs: family firms and non-family firms. Based on the widespread assumption that agency 
costs are lower in family firms, we would expect that there is less need for the disciplining 
role of debt in family firms and that they hence have lower leverage ratios. However, existing 
empirical evidence on this issue is inconclusive and largely focusing on market-based 
economies, such as the United States. While Mishra and McConaughy (1999) conclude that 
U.S. family firms use less debt to avoid a loss of control and decrease the likelihood of 
bankruptcy, Anderson and Reeb (2003b) find no systematic difference between U.S. family 
and non-family firms in terms of leverage. Finally, just recently Ellul (2008) finds a positive 
relationship between leverage and family blockholdings based on a cross-country analysis. 
However, to our best knowledge detailed empirical evidence from a bank-based economy is 
missing so far. The importance of the institutional setting for capital structure decisions is 
stressed by Antoniou et al. (2008, p. 59) who argue that “the capital structure of a firm is 
heavily influenced by the economic environment and its institutions, corporate governance 
                                                 
1 The term “capital structure puzzle” refers to Myer’s (1984) presidential address at the 1984 AFA meeting, 
when he asked the question: How do firms choose their capital structures?....we don’t know. 
2 Cf. Myers (2001) for an introduction to the extant literature on capital structure. Please note that it goes beyond 
the scope of this paper to provide a complete overview of the large body of literature on capital structure 
decisions. For an excellent albeit early review of capital structure theories cf. Harris and Raviv (1991).     4
practices, tax systems, the borrower-lender relation, exposure to capital markets, and the level 
of investor protection in the country in which the firm operates”.  
This paper builds on this research gap and aims to shed more light on hitherto 
conflicting empirical results by analysing capital structure decisions in family firms within a 
bank-based economy in greater detail. The country of our choice – Germany – seems to 
provide a very fruitful research environment since it is characterized by the following stylized 
facts: (i) a different legal and institutional setting and underdeveloped stock markets in 
comparison to anglo-saxon countries (La Porta et al. 1998, 1999, 2000) (ii) a bank-orientated 
financial system with widespread relationship lending (Wenger and Kaserer 1998, Gorton and 
Schmid 2000) (iii) a tradition where family firms are considered to be the backbone of the 
economy (Fohlin 2007) and (iv) still concentrated ownership patterns with a large amount of 
family firms even among listed companies (La Porta et al. 1999, Faccio and Lang 2002, 
Franks et al. 2008). 
 
  Starting from these conflicting observations, it is by far not clear whether family firms 
in Germany use more or less debt and what factors drive their capital structure decisions. 
Moreover, it is an open question how the different components of a family firm, namely 
founding family ownership, supervisory and management board participation, affect those 
capital structure decisions. The focus of our article is to analyse these issues in greater detail. 
Thereby, we contribute to the literature in several important dimensions: First, to our best 
knowledge our empirical study is the first to analyse capital structure decisions of family 
firms for a bank-based economy. This is interesting against the background that Germany 
differs largely from the U.S. in terms of institutional setting. We complement recent albeit 
inconsistent empirical evidence on capital structure decisions of family firms that is so far 
largely focusing on the U.S. (e.g. Mishra and McConaughy 1999, Anderson and Reeb 2003b, 
Ellul 2008). Second, in terms of methodology our analysis is more advanced than previous 
research on capital structure decisions within family firms. We do not only exploit cross-
sectional heterogeneity with “between” estimates and pooled OLS regressions but also time 
variation based on “within” estimates. Those firm fixed effects models allow us to control for 
unobserved firm heterogeneity. Finally, we employ a battery of robustness tests including a 
matching estimator that allows us to control for issues of endogeneity. Our results are highly 
robust and not subject to any special kind of methodology. Third, we investigate an aspect 
that goes beyond existing research on family firms: We carefully analyse the impact of 
different family firm characteristics on capital structure decisions. In particular, we 
distinguish between three separate components of a family firm, i.e. family ownership, family 
supervisory and management board participation.
3 In fact, that distinction allows us to show 
that firm leverage heavily depends on agency costs. From these three aspects the 
convergence-of-interest effect of family management seems to have the strongest (negative) 
influence on leverage ratios. In the case of combined family ownership and management 
board participation, in other words if the founding family is a large shareholder with 
monitoring incentives and simultaneously involved in firm management with convergence-of-
interest effects between management and outside shareholders, agency costs and hence firm 
leverage are the lowest. This outcome underlines the importance of agency cost theory in 
family firm research.
4 Moreover, in accordance with several previous performance studies 
                                                 
3 For a similar procedure in the context of family firms cf. Block (2008) or Schmid et al. (2008). 
4 An alternative framework to explain corporate decision making in family businesses is stewardship theory 
(Davis et al. 1997). Similar to agency theory, stewardship theory describes the relationship between two parties 
(the manager-principal relationship) and “defines situations in which managers are not motivated by individual 
goals, but rather are stewards whose motives are aligned with the objectives of their principals” (Davis et al. 
1997, p. 21). Family members might act as such stewards, motivated by a strong identification with the family 
business, the collective goal of optimal firm performance (pro-organizational behaviour) and family altruism. 
Although the argumentation of stewardship theory is to some extent different from agency theory, the   5
(e.g. Villalonga and Amit 2006) we detect a significant impact of founder CEOs on capital 
structure decisions. Our fourth contribution is related to the analysis of capital structure in 
Germany. In general empirical evidence on this topic based on a large sample of listed firms 
in Germany is rather limited. So far, Jostarndt and Wagner (2006) and Elsas and Florysiak 
(2008) provide the only large sample studies on capital structure in Germany. While Jostarndt 
and Wagner (2006) compare the development of capital structures in Germany and the U.S. 
over the 1994 to 2004 period, Elsas and Florysiak (2008) analyse whether recent trends in 
capital structure research hold true for Germany based on a longitudinal analysis for the 1987 
to 2006 period. However, both studies totally neglect the influence of ownership and board 
structure on firm leverage. Nevertheless, they show that the core firm-level factors 
influencing leverage decisions in the U.S. and Germany are similar. Hence, there should be no 
limitations in using German data to analyse capital structure decisions in family firms. 
Finally, our robustness tests indicate that the sample composition and the characteristics of 
newly listed firms have a strong impact on the level of capital structure. Fama and French 
(2001) have already provided a similar argument in the context of dividend policy based on a 
U.S. dataset. In this paper, we particularly show that changing firm characteristics of newly 
listed firms during the new economy bubble have a significant impact on the level of 
leverage. New lists that went public during the high tech bubble period show lower leverage 
levels than more established firms operating in traditional industries. Nevertheless, the family 
firm effect remains powerful and is not subject to any sample composition issues.  
Our analysis is based on a unique dataset of 660 industrial firms listed in the broadest 
German stock index (CDAX) during the period 1995 to 2006. Family capitalism is much 
more prevalent in Germany than for example in the U.S. (cf. e.g. La Porta et al. 1999). Of the 
660 firms, 390 qualify at least in one year as family firm. Overall, 2,410 of 5,135 firm year 
observations come from family firms (cf. table 1 for a detailed overview of the sample 
composition). The ideal research environment is reflected by the fact that, despite the 
commonness of family firms, the German capital market provides an almost equally weighted 
control group of non-family firms. Moreover, such an analysis for the German capital market 
covers a much broader spectrum of firms than similar studies focusing on S&P 500 
companies in the U.S. While the S&P 500 covers only the largest firms in the well-developed 
U.S. stock market, the German CDAX includes large-caps as well as many rather small listed 
firms. Hence, in the less developed German stock market, the CDAX represent the lion’s 
share of Germany’s entire market capitalization.  
In our empirical analysis based on pooled OLS regression, “between” estimates and 
”within” estimates, we find that family firms exhibit lower levels of leverage than their 
counterparts. Furthermore, we are able to disentangle how different family firm characteristics 
affect capital structure decisions. Thereby, the results of lower leverage in family firms seem 
to be mainly driven by family management rather than family ownership and family 
supervisory board activities. In addition, we find that the founder CEOs have a strong effect 
on our results. Founders who still act as CEO in their firm lead to significantly lower levels of 
leverage. Finally, as expected, the interaction term we construct to measure both family 
management and family ownership simultaneously is highly significant. It indicates that a 
combined effect of monitoring and convergence-of-interest leads to an especially strong 
reduction in leverage. Furthermore, we control for several factors related to firm-, industry- or 
time-specific characteristics including the six core determinants of capital structure recently 
suggested by Frank and Goyal (forthcoming). Thereby, we corroborate existing evidence 
about some stylized facts in capital structure research:  Firm size, firm age, firm-specific risk, 
the proportion of tangible assets, median industry leverage and expected inflation rate are 
positively correlated with our measures for firm leverage. In contrast, growth options 
                                                                                                                                                         
implication is similar: Compared to non-family firms, family businesses are characterised by less severe conflicts 
between owners and managers.       6
(measured by market-to-book value) and profitability show a significant negative influence on 
the level of leverage. Finally, the dummy variable for German GAAP shows a significant 
positive correlation with the level of leverage. However, this seems to be an accounting effect 
related to the “prudent” approach of asset valuation and liability recognition inherent to 
German GAAP (based on the Handelsgesetzbuch, HGB, henceforth, German-GAAP) rather 
than any economic effect. Our results are robust to several definitions of leverage, in 
particular total leverage, long-term leverage and financial leverage. Thereby, we analyse all 
leverage ratios both as market and book leverage. 
Our empirical evidence is based on large sample association tests. Hence, a natural 
concern arises whether the results are driven by methodological shortcomings or omitted 
variable bias. To alleviate these concerns, we show that our results are robust to several 
specifications (pooled OLS, within- and between-estimator) and we operate a large battery of 
further robustness checks, specification tests and alternative methodologies. Our results are 
robust to tests of non-linear size effects, alternative sub-periods, additional control variables 
and specifications as well as a matching procedure based on propensity score.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 motivates our paper 
from two different perspectives: We start with a summary of recent empirical findings for 
capital structure research regarding three aspects: (i) the impact of managerial entrenchment 
on capital structure decisions, (ii) differences between family firms and non-family firms and 
(iii) the influence of the institutional environment on capital structure. We continue with a 
theoretical argumentation why family firms are distinct from non-family firms in terms of 
agency costs and thus especially useful to test agency cost related explanations for capital 
structure decisions. Section 3 explains the construction of our dataset while Section 4 presents 
descriptive results. Section 5 shows our empirical results on different definitions of leverage 
while section 6 provides a battery of robustness tests. Finally, section 7 concludes and 
provides avenues for future research. 
 
2 Motivation and literature review 
 
2.1 What do we know about managerial entrenchment and capital structure? 
 
Starting in the late 1980s one strand of literature examines the relationship between 
managerial ownership/managerial entrenchment and capital structure in order to test how 
agency costs affect debt levels.
5 The majority of those articles (see, for example Friend and 
Lang 1988, Berger et al. 1997 or Kayhan 2005) find a significant negative relationship 
between managerial ownership/managerial entrenchment and leverage ratios. Hence, a 
prevalent view in the existing literature is that entrenched managers prefer less than optimal 
debt levels, for example to reduce human capital risk (Fama 1980, Amihud and Lev 1981), to 
avoid performance pressure induced by fixed interest payments (Jensen 1986) or for reasons 
of job retention if other candidates are better qualified (Harris and Raviv 1988, Stulz 1988). 
However, a recent U.S. study by John and Litov (2008) argues in the exact opposite direction: 
Applying the Gompers et al. (2003) corporate governance index and the Bebchuk et al. (2009) 
index of anti-takeover provisions they show that firms with entrenched managers rely more on 
debt than well-governed firms. They conclude that an equity-orientated governance system 
(with strong shareholder governance) might align interests of managers and shareholders and 
hence be good for shareholders but not necessarily be good for debtholders who have to carry 
the downside risk of value-enhancing risk-taking. Consequently, firms with high managerial 
entrenchment (weak shareholder governance) might have rely more on debt to meet their 
                                                 
5 Berger et al. (1997) define managerial entrenchment as managerial preference to avoid pressure from internal 
and external corporate governance mechanisms. In that sense, managerial ownership is a special way how 
managers can entrench themselves.    7
external financing needs than firms with strong shareholder governance and thus exhibit 
higher leverage ratios. Within the last decade several studies use another unique class of firms 
to examine the relationship of agency costs and capital structure: family firms.   
 
2.2 What do we know about family firms and capital structure? 
 
During the last decade family firms compromise a field of research that increasingly 
gained attention within the financial economics literature.
6 However, hitherto existing 
research on the question whether family firms use more or less debt than non-family firms is 
largely inconclusive. First, Mishra and McConaughy (1999) apply a matching methodology to 
isolate the effect of founding family control from managerial ownership effects. Using “The 
Business Week CEO 1000” they draw a sample of large U.S. family firms where the CEO is 
still either the founder or a relative of the founder. In a second step they match those family 
firms with two different control groups of non-family firms. Both groups have similar firm 
characteristics in terms of firm size and industry affiliation. While one group has diffuse 
ownership structures, the other has a similar level of managerial ownership. They find that 
family firms use a significantly lower level of debt. Mishra and McConaughy (1999) thereby 
show that this difference is not driven by the level of managerial ownership but rather by 
founding family peculiarities. In particular, they argue that founding families are concerned 
about two negative effects of debt: increasing costs of financial distress and the risk to lose 
control over their firms. Second, Anderson and Reeb (2003b) find no evidence for a 
systematic difference between family and non-family firms in terms of capital structure. 
Using a panel data set of 2,108 firm year observations between 1993 and 1999, they argue 
that the level of debt in U.S. industrial firms is independent of founding family control. 
Thereby, they use a family firm definition that is based on an 5%-ownership-threshold and/or 
participation of the founding family in the board of directors. Third, a recent cross-country 
study by Ellul (2008) based on a sample of 3,608 firms from 36 different countries finds 
evidence for a significant positive relationship between family blockholdings and the level of 
leverage. The author speculates that control considerations may affect this result. Family 
blockholders are concerned about the loss of control associated with external equity finance. 
From his perspective, debt offers a solution to receive external financing without diluting 
control power over the firm’s equity stake. Based on the inconclusive empirical findings of 
these studies we believe that a more detailed analysis of family firm aspects is necessary in 
order to shed more light on this important issue. 
 
2.3 What do we know about the impact of the institutional setting on capital structure? 
 
According to the “law and finance” literature, the institutional setting (such as legal 
origin, level of investor protection, legal enforcement, level of economic and financial 
development, corporate ownership patterns etc.) is a major determinant for corporate policy 
choices (La Porta et al. 1998, 1999 and 2000). Hence, it is not surprising that pioneering 
international evidence on country-specific factors affecting capital structure (Rajan and 
Zingales 1995) has recently been complemented by several studies. Demirgüc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (1999) argue that institutional differences between developing and developed 
economies (such as the development stage of the stock market and the banking system, the 
existence of government subsidies and underlying legal infrastructure) explain a large 
proportion of financing patterns. Several other recent studies have indicated that even within 
developed economies like the U.S. or Western European countries institutional factors affect 
financing patterns and corporate policies. Moreover, cross-sectional firm-specific 
                                                 
6 For a more general overview of this strand of literature cf. e.g. Schmid et al. (2008).   8
determinants of capital structure vary by country (see, for example Brounen et al. 2006, Fan et 
al. 2005 or de Jong et al. 2008). Just recently, Antoniou et al. (2008) draw a large sample of 
4,854 firms (57,134 firm year observations) during the 1987 to 2000 period in order to 
examine differences in capital structure between market-based economies (the U.K. and the 
U.S.) and bank-based economies (France, Germany and Japan) while simultaneously 
controlling for firm-specific factors. The following firm-specific factors are important for 
capital structure choices independent from the financial orientation of the company: firm size 
and the tangibility of assets positively affect firm leverage, while increases in profitability, 
growth options and share price performance decreases firm leverage. Nevertheless Antoniou 
et al. (2008, p. 61) findings confirm that “(i) the lessons learned from the experience of a 
particular type of economy cannot necessarily be generalized to firms operating in other types 
of economies; and (ii) in deciding on a firm’s financing mix, managers need to consider not 
only firm-specific factors but also general market conditions.” Such a conclusion further 
motivates an empirical study of capital structure decisions of family firms that focuses (i) on a 
bank-based economy rather than a market-based economy and (ii) a long enough sample 
period to cover market timing aspects.    
  
2.4 Theory and hypotheses  
 
As pointed out in our introduction there are many theories to explain capital structure 
decisions. Among the multitude of explanations, we follow one strand of literature that seems 
to be especially promising in the context of family firms: agency theory. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) building on earlier work by Fama and Miller (1972) were the first to argue that agency 
conflicts between management and shareholders are related to capital structure decisions. The 
free-cash-flow hypothesis of Jensen (1986) emphasizes the disciplinary role of debt as one 
effective way to reduce such agency conflicts. In particular, he argues that “debt reduces the 
agency costs of free cash flow by reducing the cash flow available for spending at the 
discretion of managers. These control effects of debt are a potential determinant of capital 
structure” (Jensen, 1986, p. 324). In fact, the commitment to regular payment of interest and 
principal is a possibility to avoid unwanted managerial behaviour, such as consumption on the 
job, inefficient investment and empire building. This mitigation of the shareholder-manager 
conflict is sometimes labelled as benefits of debt financing.
7 It is a widespread assumption 
that the management-shareholder conflict is less severe in family firms (see, for example 
Anderson et al. 2003). Hence, a comparison between family firms and non-family firms 
provides a promising empirical experiment to test the impact of agency costs on capital 
structure decisions. 
Thereby, it is essential to distinguish between the effects of the separate components 
within a family firm: family ownership and family management. Monitoring activities of large 
shareholders can reduce agency costs (Shleifer and Vishny 1986). As founding families 
usually remain large long-term shareholders they are able to overcome the free-rider problem 
commonly associated with atomistic shareholder structures (Grossman and Hart 1980). In 
contrast to atomistic shareholders they acquire the necessary information at reasonable cost, 
have firm-specific knowledge and the incentives to monitor management effectively. Hence, 
effective monitoring due to family ownership is one rationale for lower agency costs in family 
firms. Another rationale is supervisory board membership. Monitoring activities might be 
even more effective if the founding family is institutionally involved in firm’s oversight. 
                                                 
7 Note that leveraged buyouts (LBOs) provide prominent examples for the disciplinary role of debt, i.e. the 
commitment to pay interest and principal. Many studies have provided empirical evidence that the disciplinary 
burden of debt is one rationale for such leveraged buyout transactions (e.g. Lehn and Poulsen 1989, Kaplan 
1989, Baker and Wruck 1989, Denis 1994 or Cotter and Peck 2001). The first waves of LBOs occurred in the 
U.S. during the 1980s but they became increasingly popular in Europe within the last decade, too.     9
Hence, we expect that supervisory board involvement of the founding family may reduces 
agency costs as well. The third rationale is due to the regular involvement of the founding 
family in running the daily business. Whenever a member of the founding family is present in 
the management, interests of (outside) shareholders and management are aligned. This 
convergence-of-interest effect further reduces (or even eliminates) agency costs within family 
firms. In fact, agency costs are expected to be the lowest if family ownership and management 
involvement occur at a time. Hence, if the owners are involved in running the firm’s daily 
business, we expect leverage levels to be the lowest.  
Besides the agency cost rationale, other family firm characteristics might also affect 
capital structure choices. Founding families show a long-term commitment – often spanning 
more than one family generation – to the firms and provide “patient capital” (James 1999). In 
many instances, the family reputation is tied to the image and economic success of the family 
firm. The founding family does not view the firm as just a stream of cash flows but rather as 
an asset that will be bequeath to future family generations (Casson 1999 or Chami 2001). As a 
consequence, founding families might be concerned about any loss of control over the firm. 
This can affect capital structure decisions twofold: Either it is a reason to prefer debt over 
equity in order to avoid dilution of voting rights or it is a reason to avoid debt because of 
active creditor monitoring.  
Finally, founding families are usually large and undiversified investors.
8 Hence, they 
face a high risk exposure to one single asset – the family firm – that potentially leads to an 
increased risk aversion compared to a broadly diversified investor. Additionally, there might 
be non-financial reasons why founding families want to minimize the default risk of “their” 
firm. Any private benefit of the founding family like high social reputation might be lost in an 
event of the firm’s financial distress. Hence, family ownership might cause risk aversion and 
is thus expected to lead to lower leverage ratios.  
Based on this argumentation, we expect (i) family firms to have lower leverage ratios 
than their non-family counterparts, (ii) family ownership to lead to lower levels of leverage 
due to agency-cost and risk aversion considerations, (iii) family management lead to lower 
levels of leverage due to convergence-of-interest-effects and lower agency costs (with a 
stronger effect of family members participation in the management board compared to 
participation in the supervisory board), (iv) firms in which the founder still acts as CEO to 
show lower levels of leverage due to the same arguments as in (iii) and particular talent in 
firm management, (v) and finally the impact of agency costs on leverage levels to be the 
strongest if both family firm aspects – ownership and management – occur simultaneously.  
 
3 Data set and definition of variables 
 
3.1 Description of the data set 
 
Our analysis uses an unbalanced panel dataset of 660 industrial companies in Germany 
between 1995 and 2006. It is constructed in several steps: We start off by drawing a panel of 
all non-financial firms from the broadest stock index, the Composite German stock index 
(CDAX).
9 The sample selection rule requires that the common stock of a firm is listed in the 
CDAX for at least one year of the sampling period. We use the index composition published 
annually by Deutsche Börse AG to draw this sample. The choice of the sampling period from 
1995 to 2006 results from data availability constraints: The disclosure of voting rights (not 
cash-flow rights) was not mandatory in Germany before 1995. According to the German 
                                                 
8 Cf. Anderson et al. (2003, p. 267). Based on an analysis of Forbes’ Wealthiest American data they report that 
U.S. families on average invest 69% of their wealth in the firm. 
9 Based on their two-digit primary SIC-Codes 60-65 and 67 we identify 153 firms form the financial service 
sector. Following several other studies we exclude them from our analysis due to their accounting specifics.   10
Securities Trading Act (Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, WpHG) the reporting of corporate 
ownership to both the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) and the traded 
company itself became mandatory for shareholders in 1995 starting with an ownership 
threshold of 5%. Hence, the starting point for our sampling period is 1995 since the quality of 
ownership data in Germany is not reliable beforehand. Our sample period ends in 2006 which 
was the last year with available ownership, accounting and capital market information when 
constructing the dataset. Since we analyse family firms, it is essential to have information 
about the firm’s founder. We primarily use the history section of Hoover’s Company Profiles 
from the Hoovers Online database to identify the company founders’ names. We complement 
missing information by collecting information from company homepages and conducting 
press research from Factiva and LexisNexis. Despite intensive research, we were not able to 
obtain this information for 26 firms, which were excluded from our sample.
10 Additionally, 
we have hand-collected information about the firm’s ownership and board structures. The 
core of this data comes from Hoppenstedt Aktienführer. Hoppenstedt collects annual data on 
ownership structures, management and supervisory board composition of publicly listed 
German firms. Nevertheless, we further use Bureau van Dijk’s Amadeus  database, 
Commerzbank’s Wer gehört zu wem and web research in order to verify ownership 
information. Our sample with complete information on company founders, ownership and 
board structures covers 660 firms (5,135 firm years).
11 In a final step, we merge this dataset 
with accounting and capital market data from the Thomson Financial Worldscope and 
Datastream databases.    
Our sample of 660 industrial firms contains several types of firms: First, it includes 
world-renown, large and well-established firms with a long firm history mostly operating in 
traditional industries, such as Siemens, Bayerische Motoren Werke or Thyssen-Krupp. 
Second, there are companies that emerged during Germany’s post-war economic miracle, 
such as the publishing house Axel Springer or the former state-owned airline Lufthansa AG. 
Finally, the sample covers also successful new-economy start-ups from high-tech industries, 
such as internet, biotech or solar-energy.   
Our sample selection criteria limit our analysis to exchange listed family firms only. 
Although it could be argued that our conclusions might not be representative for the large 
body of smaller non-listed family firms, we have chosen this sample since there are enormous 
data availability constraints with non-listed companies. However, since our empirical study is 
based on Germany’s broadest stock index, we expect that our results illuminate interesting 
links between family capitalism and capital structure decisions.  
 
3.2 Classification of family firms 
 
Following the extant body of literature on listed family firms, our definition of a 
family firm is based on two components: the ownership and management component. In 
particular, we classify a firm within our sample as a family firm if at least one of the 
following three conditions is satisfied: (i) the founding family has voting rights of at least 
25% (family ownership) and/or (ii) at least one member of the founding family is represented 
in the supervisory board (supervisory board participation) (iii) at least one member of the 
founding family is involved in top management (management board participation).
12 The fact 
                                                 
10 Please note that we have to exclude less than 4% of all industrial CDAX firms due to missing founder 
information. 
11 Although we have complete ownership and board data for 5.135 firm-year observations, we cannot use all 
observations in our regressions (section 5) due to incomplete or missing accounting data from Worldscope.   
12 Traditionally, Germany is classified by a two-tier corporate governance structure with the management board 
being responsible for the management decisions concerning the daily business and the supervisory board for 
appointing the members of the management board and monitoring them.     11
that we use 25% of voting rights as ownership threshold is related to the typically more 
concentrated ownership structures in continental Europe (among others cf. e.g. La Porta et al. 
1999 or Faccio and Lang 2002). Moreover, 25% compromises an important control threshold 
according to the German stock corporation act.
13 Of course, if a company was founded by a 
team of entrepreneurs (such as e.g. in the case of Villeroy & Boch AG by Niclas Villeroy and 
Francois Boch or in the case of SinnerSchrader AG by Oliver Sinner and Martin Schrader), 
the term founding family might refer to more than one family. Based on this definition we 
have created a dummy variable called Family Firm which is one if the firm qualifies as a 
family business according to our definition and zero otherwise. Overall, our sample consists 
of 660 firms and 5,135 firm year observations: 2,410 family firm year observations and 2,725 
non-family firm year observations. For an overview of the sample composition over time cf. 
table 1.  
  
– Insert table 1 about here – 
 
In a second step, we test whether differences in capital structure are driven by family 
ownership or family management. Therefore, we substitute the dummy variable family firm in 
all our regression models by three variables: (i) family ownership, (ii) supervisory board 
participation and (iii) management board participation. Family ownership is the cumulated 
ownership fraction of the founding family. Supervisory board participation is a dummy 
variable with unit value one if a member of the founding family is part of the supervisory 
board. The same dummy variable is constructed for management board participation.  
Finally we run all regressions with two other specifications: First, we analyse the 
impact of the firm’s CEO. Several other studies, e.g. Anderson and Reeb (2003a) or 
Villalonga and Amit (2006), argue that the identity of the CEO is of special importance for 
the firm’s corporate policy and performance. Following those studies, we construct a dummy 
variable called founder CEO that takes unit value one if the founder is still running the firm as 
CEO and zero otherwise. Second, we interact family ownership and management 
participation. The interaction term allows us to investigate the hypothesis that the effect of 
agency costs on capital structure is strongest if the founding family is simultaneously a large 
shareholder and involved in running the firm’s daily business.   
 
3.3 Measurement of leverage 
 
We measure leverage in several ways:  
 
(i) We start with a broad definition of book and market leverage. Book leverage is the 
ratio of total liabilities to total assets while the market leverage is the ratio of total liabilities to 
the market value of equity plus total liabilities. Thereby, we treat preferred equity as equity 
rather than debt.
14 By applying such a broad definition of leverage we follow several other 
                                                 
13 Recent empirical studies on family firm performance and behaviour for France (Sraer and Thesmar 2007) and 
Germany (Andres 2007, 2008, Schmid et al. 2008) use similar family ownership thresholds in order to adjust for 
the more concentrated ownership structures in Continental Europe. 
14 This is in contrast to several U.S. studies, e.g. Kayhan and Titman (2007) or Baker and Wurgler (2002) who 
treat preferred stock as debt. Our choice is related to the large differences in the arrangement of preferred equity 
between Germany and the U.S. While holders of common shares in Germany have a voting right in the 
shareholders assembly, holders of preference shares do usually not. The missing voting right is compensated by 
the payment of a preferred dividend. According to the German stock corporation act (§ 140 AktG), a preferred 
share receives a voting right and becomes factual a common share whenever the firm cannot meet the payment 
of a preferred dividend in two subsequent years. This is one example why we decided to treat preferred equity as 
equity rather than debt. However, as indicated in the robustness section our results remain qualitatively 
unchanged if we treat preferred equity as debt.     12
studies on capital structure (e.g. Rajan and Zingales 1995, Fama and French 2002, Baker and 
Wurgler 2002 or Kayhan and Titman 2007). Moreover, just recently Elsas and Florysiak 
(2008) have applied similar definitions of leverage for a large sample study of capital 
structure in the German environment. This broad definition includes non-interest-bearing debt 
components, such as pension liabilities or accounts payable, and is likely to overestimate 
financial leverage. Although such a definition is not a very good indication for the future 
default probability, for many firms those non-interest-bearing debt components are important 
parts of their capital structure. 
 
(ii) We run all regression models with a definition of long-term leverage. Long-term 
book leverage is defined as total liabilities minus current liabilities divided by total assets. 
Accordingly, long-term market leverage is defined as total liabilities minus current liabilities 
to market value of equity plus total liabilities. 
 
(iii) Finally, we calculate a financial leverage that only considers interesting-bearing 
debt components. Our measure for the book value of financial leverage is calculated as total 
liabilities minus the sum of accounts payable, provisions for risks and charges (including 
pension liabilities) and deferred taxes divided by total assets minus the sum of accounts 
payable, provisions for risks and charges (including pension liabilities) and deferred taxes. As 
in the two other measures of leverage, we replace the book value of equity with the market 
value of equity when we calculate the market value of financial leverage.
15 
     
3.4 Definition of control variables 
   
In our analysis, we use a set of control variables (for a detailed overview of all 
variables cf. table 2). Frank and Goyal (forthcoming) show that there are six core factors that 
can explain firm leverage for publicly traded American companies over the period 1950 to 
2003: Firm size, profitability, market-to-book ratio, tangible assets ratio, median industry 
leverage and expected inflation. We include all these factors, which are described below, in 
our analysis.  
Since we already use total assets to scale our dependent variable, we use the natural 
logarithm of the number of employees to control for firm size (FIRM SIZE). Firm size is 
included in all specifications to account for the fact that larger firms have a higher 
creditworthiness, easier access to debt markets and might be able to borrow at lower costs. 
Moreover, larger firms might use their financing-mix to maximize tax benefits. Overall, we 
anticipate a positive relation between firm size and leverage.  
Family firms might experience lower agency costs of free cash flow and depend more 
on internal financing. We use an operating profit margin calculated as earnings before 
interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization divided by total assets (PROFITABILITY) as a 
proxy for firm profitability. The pecking order theory suggests that firms prefer to finance 
new investment projects with retained earnings followed by new debt while issuing external 
equity is only the last resort of financing. Consequently, we expect an inverse relationship 
between the firm profitability and the leverage ratio.  
We control for the firm’s growth options by including the market-to-book ratio 
(MARKET-TO-BOOK) into our regressions. Information asymmetries may lead firms to 
issue equity instead of debt if they have NPV-positive projects (Myers 1977). Furthermore, 
                                                 
15 Please note that the Worldscope Database does not in every case report all components that are imperative to 
our definition of financial leverage. As a consequence, we experience a drop in the number of firm clusters that 
are eligible for analysis of financial leverage. Hence, our results of financial leverage have to be treated with 
some caution. Additionally, we eliminate all leverage ratios which are larger than one or below zero. This 
procedure is consistently applied for all definitions of leverage.    13
firms may prefer to retain earnings instead of distributing them if they have valuable growth 
options. Hence, we expect market-to-book ratio to be negatively related to leverage.  
We include the ratio of tangible assets to totals assets (TANGIBLE ASSETS RATIO) 
in our analysis to account for the fact that tangible assets function as collateral and hence 
increase borrowing capacity. We expect the tangibility ratio to be positively correlated to the 
firm’s leverage. 
 The median industry leverage (MEDIAN INDUSTRY LEVERAGE) is included as a 
control for industry originalities. Firms operating in highly levered industries are expected to 
exhibit higher leverage ratios. For example, Frank and Goyal (forthcoming) show that the 
industry median leverage ratio has the single largest explanatory power for the firm-level 
leverage in their long-term dataset on U.S. firms. Although we use industry dummies to 
control for industry effects in general, we therefore include industry median leverage in our 
regressions as an additional control variable. This measure is calculated for each industry and 
year, whereby the firm’s industry classification is based on its one-digit primary SIC-Code. 
Of course, we expect industry leverage to have a positive impact on firm leverage.  
The expected inflation rate (EXPECTED INFLATION RATE) is another variable 
with high explanatory power for leverage ratios. We anticipate firms to show higher levels of 
leverage if the expected inflation rate is high since debt becomes more attractive in these time 
periods. In our analysis, we use the next year’s realised inflation rate as a proxy for the 
expected inflation rate. In order to investigate if this adoption leads to biased results, we 
applied the one-year inflation rate forecast of the German “Sachverständigenrat” as an 
alternative measure of expected inflation (results not reported). However, the results for these 
two measures are qualitatively the same. 
Besides these control factors proposed by Frank and Goyal (2009) we include several 
additional variables in our regressions, which are described below.   
The dividend payout ratio (PAYOUT RATIO) is likely to play an important role for 
the firm’s financing mix. For example, Rozeff (1982) predicts an inverse relationship between 
dividend payout and leverage due to agency costs and transaction costs arguments. Also if 
dividends are considered to be a signal for future earnings, firms with high dividend payout 
ratios face lower cost of equity. They might prefer equity instead of debt and hence we expect 
a negative relationship between the firm’s dividend payout ratio and the firm’s leverage. 
However, we adopt the payout ratio as suggested by Julio and Ikenberry (2004) and von Eije 
and Megginson (2008): We set the payout ratio to 1 if it is negative (because of negative 
income) or above one.  
Firm age (FIRM AGE) is the natural logarithm of the number of years since the firm’s 
incorporation. Thereby, the number of years since the firm’s incorporation is calculated as the 
current sample year minus the founding year of the firm. We expect younger firms ceteris 
paribus to have better growth options than older firms. Younger firms might be more reliable 
on equity instead of debt and prefer to retain earnings within the firm to finance their growth 
options. Simultaneously we hypothesize that older firms have more tangible assets, a better 
borrowing capacity and are more profitable. Hence, the expected relationship between firm 
age and leverage is positive. 
One potential concern is that founding family ownership is not randomly assigned to 
different industries. In particular, instead of applying risk-reducing strategies at the firm level, 
founder families might prefer to invest in low-risk businesses and industries. Consequently, 
we include a measure of firm-specific risk (FIRM SPECIFIC RISK). Firm-specific risk 
captures the part of stock prize volatility that is unique to an individual firm and thus related 
to specific operations or capital structure decisions. It is calculated as the residuals’ sum of 
squares (SSE) from a regression of the individual stock returns on the returns of the market   14
(CDAX) over the preceding calendar year based on stock prizes from calendar year end.
16 
Since higher debt-to-equity ratios increase the firm’s risk of default, we expect a positive 
relationship between firm specific risk and leverage.  
Decisions about capital structure are dependent on the firm’s governance structure. 
Consequently, we include some corporate governance measures in our analysis. Monitoring 
by outside shareholders might be an alternative to incentive alignment as a corporate 
governance device in order to alleviate the classical shareholder-manager conflict. Hence, we 
include the cumulative corporate ownership of large outside shareholders with an ownership 
stake of at least 5% in our analysis (OUTSIDE BLOCKHOLDERS). Alternatively, as 
indicated in our section about robustness tests, we control for the presence of a second large 
shareholder besides the founding family. 
In Germany, the sample period 1995 to 2006 is characterised by a huge heterogeneity 
in terms of applied accounting standards. This is due to the introduction of the capital raising 
facilitating act (Kapitalaufnahmeerleichterungsgesetz – KapAEG) in 1998. According to this 
law, all listed German consolidated companies have the possibility to prepare annual 
consolidated financial statements either in IFRS/IAS (International Financial Reporting 
Standards or respectively International Accounting Standards, henceforth IFRS) or US-
GAAP. Simultaneously they face no requirement to prepare additional annual consolidated 
(not individual) financial statement in German GAAP if they apply IFRS or US-GAAP. From 
2005 onwards, the usage of IFRS is mandatory for consolidated companies according to § 
315a German GAAP.
17 Hence, all firms change the applied accounting standard during the 
sample period. Since the valuation of assets and liabilities is largely dependent on the 
application of a true-and-fair-view accounting system (such as IFRS or US-GAAP) or a 
conservative accounting system (such as German GAAP),
18 we control for accounting 
systems with a dummy variable for the application of German GAAP (DUMMY 
ACCOUNTING STANDARD). The dummy variable takes unit value one if the firm applies 
German GAAP and is zero if the firm applies either IFRS or US-GAAP. Due to the principle 
of prudence in German GAAP we expect a positive relationship between the usage of a 
conservative accounting system and the leverage ratio. 
Theory predicts that mature industries with less opportunity for asset substitution 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976) have higher leverage ratios. Hence, we use industry dummies 
based on one-digit SIC codes in all our regressions to control for such industry specifics.
19 
Capital structure decisions might be subject to macroeconomic and legal conditions. To 
control for such time effects we include year dummies in all our analysis.  
 





                                                 
16 One might argue that a measure of total risk (market risk plus firm-specific risk) is more suitable than firm-
specific risk in our context. However, as indicated in our section about the robustness of our results we have used 
total risk as an alternative control variable in our analysis. Results remain unchanged and are therefore robust to 
the usage of total risk as an alternative measure of firm risk.  
17 However, the option to apply US-GAAP instead of IFRS remains transitional until 2007. 
18 For a detailed description of the peculiarities of German GAAP cf. Leuz and Wüstemann (2004). See Hung 
and Subramanyam (2007) for related empirical evidence on accounting differences between German GAAP and 
IFRS. 
19 Cf. Jensen (1989) for another argument why certain industries are especially prone to high levels of debt 
capital. Industries with low growth options but high cash resources benefit from the reduction of free cash flow 
that goes along with high leverage. Hence, leverage can be one way to reduce empire building or consumption 
on the job in such industries.   15
4 Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for all sample companies as well as the two 
subgroups family and non-family firms. As the t-test of differences in means indicates there 
seem to be huge differences among these two subgroups of firms. Family firms are smaller (in 
assets, sales and employees) and as a result have smaller management and supervisory boards. 
They are younger both in terms of years since incorporation and years since the Initial Public 
Offering. For example, family firms are on average 31 years old, in comparison to an average 
age of 72 years for non-family firms. Furthermore, several differences in accounting based 
figures or accounting standard can be found.  
Since our study focuses on differences in leverage, it is very interesting that the 
descriptive statistics indicate that family firms have lower levels of leverage than their non-
family counterparts. For example, the mean (median) book leverage is 0.49 (0.5) for family 
firms in comparison to 0.62 (0.66) for non-family firms. Similar differences occur for market 
leverage with 0.36 (0.39) for family firms in comparison to 0.54 (0.53) for non-family firms. 
Statistically significant differences in similar magnitude do also occur for long-term leverage 
and financial leverage indicating that there are large differences in terms of capital structure 
between the two firm groups.   
 
– Insert table 3 about here – 
 
5 Empirical results 
 
5.1 Methodology  
 
Our data structure is organised as an unbalanced panel of 660 firms that are tracked 
over the 1995 to 2006 period. The panel structure of our data allows us to present three types 
of regression estimates: pooled OLS, “between” estimates and “within” estimates. From an 
econometric point of view, all three estimates have advantages and disadvantages. “Between” 
estimates are OLS estimates of firm means across time. “Within” estimates are OLS estimates 
of deviations from the firm means across time (also called fixed effects model since they 
include firm-fixed effects). While the “between” estimates only employs cross-sectional 
variation, the “within”-estimates only uses variation over time within each section. The 
pooled OLS estimator combines both aspects as it is a weighted average of both the 
”between” and ”within” estimators.
20 By reporting all three models, we follow earlier work on 
capital structure by Berger et al. (1997) in terms of methodology and try to show that our 
results are robust against several different estimation techniques.  
Thereby, the fixed-effects estimator has one strong advantage: It offers the possibility 
to control for unobserved, time-invariant firm heterogeneity. A recent study by Lemmon et al. 
(2009) indicates that the adjusted R-squares of leverage regressions with firm fixed effects are 
much higher than the adjusted R-squares from traditional leverage regressions. Hence, such 
firm fixed effects seem to have a high explanatory power for capital structure decisions. 
However, in our context the results of the fixed-effects estimator have to be interpreted with 
caution since the ownership and board structures among listed German firms are rather stable 
and thus offer little potential to exploit variation over time. As a consequence, the results for 
these estimations may be driven by variations in few firm-year observations. Consequently, it 
                                                 
20 An alternative to the application of pooled OLS estimates with adjusting the standard errors for the panel 
structure of the dataset is to run GLS under random-effects assumptions. However, GLS requires stronger 
assumptions than the pooled OLS with clustered standard errors and only provides modest efficiency gains. (cf. 
Angrist and Pischke (2008)). Hence, we prefer pooled OLS with clustered standard errors as suggested by 
Petersen (2009) over GLS under random-effects-assumptions.   16
is useful to exploit cross-sectional variance by the “between” and pooled-OLS estimates as 
well. In addition, “between” estimates allow to mitigate concerns that observations drawn 
repeatedly from the same sample are independent from each other. Contrary to the “within” 
estimates, pooled OLS and “between” estimates may be biased if unobservable, time-invariant 
firm-specific factors exist, leading to a correlation of the error term with the independent 
variables. This happens if our models fail to include all relevant explanatory variables that are 
correlated with both the regressors and the dependent variable. Since no single model 
combines all advantages, we decide to report the estimates of all three models (OLS, 
“between” and “within” estimates). 
In the context of panel datasets it is essential to estimate the standard errors in a 
correct way as indicated by Petersen (2009). As suggested by him, we calculate the standard 
errors in the pooled-OLS-specifications
21 and the “within”-estimates using the cluster-robust 
VCE estimator (this is not necessary for the “between” estimates since there is only one 
observation per firm and hence no time-series correlation). Our calculation includes 
adjustment for non-i.i.d. distributed standard errors, resulting both from heteroskedasticity 
(Huber-White standard errors, cf. White 1980) and time-series correlation. Finally, we 
calculate variance inflation factors (VIFs) to detect any multicollinearity problem. However, 
the calculated (not reported) VIFs indicate that our variables are not subject to any issues of 
multicollinearity. The results of our analysis are reported in tables 4 to 9 at the end of the 
paper. 
 
5.2 Family firms vs. non-family firms 
 
In a first step we analyse differences in leverage between family and non-family firms. 
We find that family firms show significantly lower levels of leverage. This is true for total 
leverage, long-term leverage and financial leverage both with book and market values of 
equity. The coefficients of the dummy variable family firm estimated by OLS, ”between” and 
”within” estimates are all negative and in most cases statistically significant. The strongest 
evidence in terms of statistical significance for our claim is provided if we use long-term 
market leverage (cf. table 7, model I). For this, the coefficients estimated by the three models 
show a similar magnitude, which lies between 0.26 and 0.53, and are highly statistically 
significant. Additionally, the coefficients indicate high economic significance as well. For 
market leverage, we find – based on OLS estimates – that family firms have a leverage ratio 
that is about 19% lower compared to the sample mean of all non-family firms. To summarise, 
our results support the hypothesis of lower leverage levels in family firms compared to non-
family firms. It is interesting to note that the adjusted R-square of our regressions are 
comparable to earlier empirical work on capital structure decisions: For example, for book 
leverage (market leverage), it is between 28% and 29% (between 25% and 26%) for OLS-
estimates, between 35% and 36% (between 31% and 32%) for “between”-estimates and 
between 81% and 82% (between 80% and 81%) for the “within” estimates. Thereby, in 
accordance with Lemmon et al. (2009) we observe a strong explanatory power of firm fixed 
effects. Two implications are important in this context: First, our German data are obviously 
driven by a similar data generating process as comparable U.S. data. Second, the strong 
economic and statistical importance of family firm characteristics in explaining leverage 





                                                 
21 As shown by Petersen (2009), standard errors clustered by firms are unbiased, even if the firm-specific effect 
is temporary.    17
5.3 Three components: Family ownership, supervisory board and management board 
 
Next, we distinguish between the three components that qualify a firm as family firm: 
Family ownership, family management and family supervisory board. As expected, we find 
that family participation in the firm’s management board leads to lower levels of leverage. 
However, the analysis indicates almost no evidence for our hypothesis that founding family 
ownership leads to less leverage. For founding family participation in the supervisory board, 
we neither find any statistically significant effect. Since founding family participation in the 
management board reduces agency costs more effectively through a convergence-of-interest-
effect, this result is not surprising. To summarise, we find strong evidence in favour of the 
agency cost hypothesis of family management. For participation in the supervisory board and 
a reduction of agency costs by firm oversight, we find no convincing support. Contrary to our 
expectations, we neither find any support for the risk aversion and monitoring hypothesis of 
family ownership.  
 
5.4 The effect of a founder CEO 
 
As argued before, we expect that the presence of the founder as CEO leads to lower 
levels of leverage due to lower agency costs within these firms. Additionally, we hypothesize 
that the presence of the founder as CEO reduces agency costs even more effectively than just 
the presence of a founding family member in the management board (as investigated in the 
previous section). CEOs are especially important for corporate policies.
22 Founder CEOs are 
special in a number of ways: they often consider the firm as their life-time achievement and 
might show a strong commitment to the firm rather than enjoying the “quiet life”. Founder 
CEOs might have superior technological skills or firm-specific knowledge, or even more 
entrepreneurial talent in comparison to descendent or non-family CEOs. Moreover, founder 
CEOs have shaped their organizations from the very beginning and might therefore have an 
especially strong influence on corporate decision making.
23 Hence, we expect the size of the 
coefficients of the dummy variable for founder CEO to be larger than the coefficient for the 
presence of members of the founding family in the management board. Our empirical results 
show strong support for this hypothesis. The dummy variable for founder CEO is negative in 
all our specifications. Even more, there is a high statistical significance of the estimated 
coefficients. Every founder CEO coefficient except for one is statistical significant at least at 
the 5 %-level, with most coefficients being significant at the 1%-level. Furthermore, the effect 
of a founder CEO is – as expected – in 14 of the 18 models higher than the effect of family 
management (the participation of a member of the founding family in the management board) 
in the previous models.  
 
5.5 Two components at a time: Family ownership with simultaneous family management  
 
In order to analyse the effect of reduced agency costs even further, we apply an 
interaction term of founding family ownership and founding family participation in the 
management board. We do not consider participation in the supervisory board because the 
analysis described above shows that we cannot find significant effects for supervisory board. 
Since this interaction is different from zero only if founding family ownership and 
                                                 
22 See for example Bertrand and Schoar (2003), Bennedsen et al. (2006) or Frank and Goyal (2007). 
23 Cf. Fahlenbrach (2008) for a similar argumentation about the special capabilities of founder CEOs. See 
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2008) for the “quiet life view” of CEOs and Adams et al. (2005) for empirical 
evidence on the strong decision power of founder CEOs. In line with this view, several studies have confirmed 
that corporate performance advantages of family firms depend on CEO identity; see for example Anderson and 
Reeb (2003a), Villalonga and Amit (2006) or Perez-Gonzalez (2006).    18
participation in the management board are present at the same time, we expect it to be a very 
powerful measure of reduced agency costs due to low conflicts between shareholders and 
management (which are, at least to some extent, members of the founding family).  
Our results support this hypothesis. The coefficient for the interaction term is negative 
in all our models, indicating that simultaneous ownership and management board 
participation lead to lower levels of leverage. In most models, the estimates are statistically 
significant, often at the 1%-level (in 11 out of 18 models).  
 
5.6 Interpretation of control variables 
 
We find that firm size has a positive and highly significant correlation with the level of 
leverage in the majority of our regression models. However, the empirical finding that large 
and growing companies - as indicated by the fixed effects model coefficient - have more debt 
in their balance sheet is not surprising. Another highly significant control variable that is 
positively correlated with leverage is firm specific risk. Again, this is not surprising since a 
higher leverage increases costs of financial distress and hence risk of default. Firm age 
(measured by the natural logarithm of years since incorporation) is positively correlated with 
the level of leverage as well. Mature firms tend to use more debt than younger firms. The 
tangibility ratio measured by tangible assets divided by total assets shows – as expected by 
capital structure theories – a positive correlation with the level of leverage in most of our 
models since collaterals increase borrowing capacity. For payout ratio, median industry level 
and expected inflation rate we find a positive and statistically significant effect in the majority 
of our models as well. In contrast, growth options (measured by the market-to-book ratio) and 
profitability have on average a negative influence on the leverage ratio. All these findings are 
consistent with standard capital structure theories and the recent empirical findings for the 
U.S. and Germany presented in Frank and Goyal (forthcoming) and Elsas and Florysiak 
(2008), respectively.  
Interestingly, we find that firms which follow German GAAP have higher levels of 
leverage. However, the reason for this is likely to be found in differences in accounting rules 
rather than economic differences: German GAAP requires firms to account their liabilities 
very carefully (hence they are likely to overestimate them), while the main objective of 
international accounting standards (IFRS, US-GAAP) is to draw a true picture of the firm’s 
assets and liabilities in place.
24 For outside block ownership we cannot find an effect that is 
persistent over all of our models.  
 
6 Robustness tests 
 
This section explores the robustness of our results along five main dimensions: (i) 
misspecification of our regressions (ii) non-linear effects of firm size (iii) the impact of 
changing market conditions over time (iv) insider ownership and (v) endogeneity issues. All 
our robustness tests apply to two particular models: First, we check for the robustness in 
overall differences between family and non-family firms. Thereby, we use the market 
leverage definition. Some of the robustness tests are reported in tables 10. Second, we 
investigate the robustness of our results for the founder CEO effect. The results are reported 
in table 11 at the end of the paper, but not discussed here since they are similar to those of the 
robustness tests for family firms. Other robustness tests are not reported in detail.  
 
– Insert table 10 about here – 
                                                 
24 For related empirical evidence cf. Hung and Subramanyam (2007) who show that the accounting standard has 
a strong impact on the valuation of assets and liabilities. While German GAAP use a “prudent” accounting 
approach (balance sheet conservatism), IFRS are characterized by a true-and-fair-view orientation.    19
6.1 Misspecification issues 
 
Our results are robust to the usage of several alternative control variables, such as ln 
sales in lieu of ln employees as a proxy for firm size, total risk in lieu of firm-specific risk, a 
dummy variable for dividend payment in lieu of payout ratio and ln IPO age in lieu of ln 
founding age to control for firm age. Furthermore, our results are also robust to the treatment 
of preferred capital as debt rather than equity. Our results remain qualitatively unchanged if 
we include the following additional control variables: cash-to-assets, a measure for liquidity 
based on the ratio of current assets-to-current liabilities and preferred to total equity. 
Furthermore our results are not significantly changed if we measure outside shareholder 
monitoring in several other ways. For example, we have created dummy variables for the 
existence of outside shareholders at several important control thresholds, such as 5%, 10% 
and 25%. We have also distinguished between outside monitoring by strategic and financial 
investors. None of those modifications changed our results.  
Elsas and Florysiak (2008) use regressor variables lagged by one year in all of their 
regressions. Behind this procedure is the idea that current firm characteristics, such as firm 
size and available collateral, determine future borrowing capacity. In contrast, we have used 
contemporaneous firm characteristics in all our regressions. However, our results remain 
largely unchanged if we use lagged instead of contemporaneous regressors (cf. table 10).  
  Our empirical tests of the founder CEOs indicate that firms under the leadership of the 
company founder exhibit significant lower leverage ratios. However, since such effects 
require an active company founder those results might be biased towards younger firms. 
Hence we apply an alternative dummy variable for family CEOs that take unit value one if the 
founder or a relative of the founder is CEO. This robustness check rendered similar results 
indicating that besides the founder CEO effect any family member in charge of running the 
family business significantly reduces the leverage within the firm.
25 
   
6.2 Non-linear effects of firm size and outlier-correction 
 
Linear regressions only correct for linear influences of control variables. In order to 
control for non-linear effects of firm size, we (i) include a squared term of firm sizes (ln 
employees) and additionally (ii) divide our sample in two sub-samples. In particular, we use 
the median value of firm size (ln employees and alternatively ln sales) to divide the sample in 
two sub-samples of equal size and then employ the same regression models as for the whole 
sample (only based on the pooled OLS regressions to cover cross-sectional and across time 
variance). Overall, both methods lead to qualitatively unchanged findings indicating that there 
is no non-linear size effect driving our results (cf. table 10). 
In order to check whether our results are sensitive to outliers we have winsorized our 
variables at 2.5%. We find qualitatively the same results as for our regressions without outlier 





                                                 
25 At first glance this result is surprising having in mind the numerous studies of U.S. family firms who find only 
a founder CEO-effect for corporate performance but conclude that firms with descendent CEOs perform worse 
than firms with founder CEOs (for example, see Villalonga and Amit 2006 or Perez-Gonzalez 2006). However, 
our analysis of the family CEO remains largely driven by founder CEOs. Additionally, it is interesting that Sraer 
and Thesmar (2007) in their analysis of French family firms find that both family firms with founder CEOs and 
descendant CEOs perform better than family firms with outside CEOs. Against the background that France is 
similar to Germany in terms of institutional environment it is interesting to note that there seems to be not so 
strong differences in both countries in terms of CEO quality between founders and descendents.     20
6.3 Sample composition effects 
 
Our unbalanced sample is influenced in two important ways: First, a large number of 
new lists went public during the 1998 to 2000 IPO boom phase.
26 Against the background of 
the comparatively less developed German stock market this was an uncommon large IPO 
wave. Most of those new lists are young high-tech firms that went public at the technology 
stock exchange “Neuer Markt”. Another time trend reflected in our sample is the wave of 
going private transactions after the introduction of the “squeeze-out-law” in 2002. It allowed 
majority owners of many traditional firms by law to compensate minority shareholders and 
take the firm private if they have at least 95% of voting rights. Table 1 indicates that the 
importance of family firms in our sample is increasing over time. While in 1995 – the starting 
year of our sample period – 28% of firms are family businesses (65 firms out of 230), in 2006 
236 out of 494 firms are family businesses (48%). In the context of capital structure decisions, 
the changing sample composition can affect our results in several ways. One concern is that 
new lists during the 1998 to 2000 period have different firm characteristics than established 
companies. For the U.S., Fama and French (2004) have argued that both the number and 
characteristics of new lists has changed dramatically in the U.S. Cross sectional 
characteristics of new lists show more left skewed profitability in combination with more 
right skewed growth options resulting in a sharp decline of survival rate. Fama and French 
(2001) further show that those changing firm characteristics can have a large influence on 
corporate policy decisions, such as payout policy. Hence, we analyse whether the changing 
characteristics of new lists – that play an important role according to the pecking order theory 
of capital structure – affect our results. To do so, we run all regression models for two 
additional, separate sub-samples: One regression is based on a sub-sample of firms whose 
Initial Public Offering was in the 1998 to 2000 period and one regression for the sub-sample 
of firm with an IPO before or after this IPO boom phase. However, by excluding the “Neuer 
Markt” companies our results remain qualitatively unchanged. The same regression is 
performed for companies which had their IPO during the 1998 to 2000 period. Interestingly, 
the coefficient for the dummy variable family firm is again highly significant and larger 
compared to the previous regression. This indicates that the difference in leverage is even 
more pronounced for firms which went public during this boom phase.  The second test 
involves the introduction of a dummy variable “high-tech firm” for all IPOs during this boom 
phase. However, this variable is negative, but statistically not different from zero. If the 
dummy for family firms is excluded from the model, the high-tech firm dummy is negative 
and significant at the 10%-level. However, if we compare the level of leverage between the 
traditional firms and the “Neue Markt” companies based on mean and median values of book 
and market leverage, we find significant differences between those two groups. Based on that 
univariate analysis the influence on new lists’ firm characteristics on leverage ratios is non-
deniable and statistically significant at the 1%-significance level. New lists with an IPO 
between 1998 and 2000 have a mean value of market leverage of 0.35 (median value of 0.33), 
while more mature firms (IPO before 1998 or after 2000) have on average a market leverage 
of 0.53 (median value of 0.55). Nevertheless, the influence of family firm characteristics 
remains strong in our robustness test regressions (both for the differences between family 
firms and non-family firms and the CEO founder effect) and dissipates any concerns that our 
results are driven by sample composition effects. Family firms differ from their non-family 
counterparts in terms of capital structure decisions and this result is not subject to changing 
firm characteristics of new lists.  
Second, the composition of a firm’s capital structure is determined by equity and debt 
issues. Market-timing explanations propose that firms issue equity during favourable market 
                                                 
26 Out of the 660 firms in our sample, 328 had their IPO in this time period.    21
times when equity prices are overvalued (“window of opportunity”) and buy back shares 
when equity prices are undervalued (Baker and Wurgler 2002). Especially, stock markets 
(both initial and seasoned public offerings) seem to be highly cyclical (e.g. Bayless and 
Chaplinsky 1996 or Lowry and Schwert 2002). Hence, we control for timing issues by 
dividing our sample into two sub-periods: one sub-sample covers only observations during the 
1995 to 2000 period (six years) that includes the boom phase at the IPO-market while the 
other sub-sample covers only firm-year observations during the 2001 to 2006 period (six 
years) of normal to conservative stock market climate. In both sub-periods the observed 
family firm effects remain qualitatively unchanged indicating that they are independent of any 
market timing considerations.   
 
6.4 Insider ownership 
 
As shown in our literature review several studies analyse the impact of managerial 
ownership, insider ownership or managerial entrenchment on capital structure decisions. One 
natural concern is that our results for family firms may be caused by insider ownership since 
founding family ownership is highly correlated with insider ownership.
27 Hence, we have 
conducted a robustness test to investigate whether our results are really caused by family firm 
characteristics. Thereby, insider ownership is defined as the percentage equity holdings from 
all members of the management and supervisory board., We run the regression only for those 
firms in our sample with (i) no insider ownership and (ii) insider ownership below 10%. 
Regression results indicate that insider ownership is not affecting our results substantially, 
since the coefficient for family firms is still negative and statistically significant at the 5%-
level if we exclude firms dominated by insider ownership. However, if we consider only firms 
with no insider ownership the number of observations drops significantly, from 3,741 to 
1,562. Nevertheless, these robustness tests indicate that our results are robust against the 
exclusion of firms dominated by insider ownership. Hence, our study detects family firm 
effects on capital structure decisions rather than insider ownership effects. This interpretation 
is in line with earlier findings by Mishra and McConaughy (1999) for U.S. data.  
 
6.5 Endogeneity issues  
 
One common problem with capital structure analysis is the endogeneity of ownership, 
board composition and capital structure (cf. Petersen 2009). In general, endogeneity may arise 
from three different sources: (i) measurement error (ii) potential “reverse causality” between 
capital structure and family firm characteristics and (iii) omitted variables. We want to focus 
our discussion on the issues of (ii) and (iii).  
  We start with potential “reverse causality”. The panel structure of our data allows us to 
employ lagged variables for the family firm dummy as well as the family ownership, 
supervisory and management board dummy variables. While lagged variables cannot 
completely solve the endogeneity problem they are suitable to alleviate the concern of reverse 
causality. In general, our results remain robust to the use of lagged family firm variables (cf. 
table 11). 
An issue more difficult to deal with are omitted variables, especially if the (unknown) 
firm heterogeneity affects in parallel both our dependent and independent variables. Cf. 
Himmelberg et al. (1999) for a detailed discussion of endogeneity issues in a similar context, 
i.e. managerial ownership and firm value. For this issue, again the panel structure of our data 
is helpful. The fixed effects estimator is unbiased and consistent if we assume that potentially 
unobserved omitted variables are time constant (such as e.g. the firm’s culture). However, if 
                                                 
27 Thereby, insider ownership refers to the percentage of equity held by both the management and supervisory 
board.   22
this is not the case and the unobserved, omitted variables are not constant over time, the 
endogeneity problem is still prevalent. One obvious solution to this problem would be the 
application of instrumental variables. Such instrumental variables must be uncorrelated with 
the dependent variable while they simultaneously have to show a high correlation with the 
potentially endogenous independent variable (which in our case is the dummy family firm or 
the family firm characteristics ownership and management). The natural solution – the use of 
observed firm characteristics as instruments for the family firm and its components – is 
practically difficult since they are used as further control variables for capital structure 
decisions. Due to the lack of strong instruments we apply another methodology to control for 
endogeneity issues. Angrist (1998) argues that the application of a matching estimator has 
similar advantages as instrumental variables. A natural solution would be to match family 
firms with similar non-family firms. However, for the application of matching estimators it is 
a crucial point to restrict the choice of the vector of control variables X that assign the 
observations to either the treatment or control group to ones that are not influenced by the 
treatment itself. This is necessary in order to assume exogenous or unconfounded assignment 
to treatment. As a practical consequence, the matching procedure must often rely on pre-
treatment variables. The natural treatment in our case would be the status as a family firm 
itself. However, in this case there are no pre-treatment variables, since family firms according 
to our definition are already “born” as a family business from the very incorporation.  
Hence, we have to use another treatment which is the change from a family firm to a 
non-family firm.
28 Thereby, we construct our matched sample as follows: First, we consider 
only firms that were family firms during the sample period. In a second step, we identify 
those firms which evolve from a family firm to a non-family firm. This evolvement is used as 
treatment, whereby the “treated” firms are matched to “untreated” firms, namely firms that 
remain family firms. Albeit ownership and board structures are rather stable over time, we are 
able to identify 97 firms which evolve from a family to a non-family firm. We apply kernel 
matching based on a propensity score for each year. The propensity score is based on pre-
treatment variables that influence both the probability of treatment and the outcome. This is 
necessary to ensure that the outcome variable is independent of treatment conditional on the 
propensity score.
29 We decided to apply the following variables (measured one year before 
the treatment): founding family ownership, number of founding family members in 
supervisory and management board, outside block ownership, firm size, profitability, firm age 
and industry classification. Our identification strategy is to show that the treatment (which is 
the change from a family firm to a non-family firm) has a significant (positive) impact on the 
level of leverage. To allow for a reasonable time of capital structure adjustment, we compare 
the book leverage two years before and two years after the treatment. We find that the average 
treatment effect on the treated (ATT) is 0.104 and the corresponding t-value is 1.95. Since 
standard errors may be biased we alternatively used a bootstrapping method to calculate them, 
but the results were in the same order of magnitude.  
Besides the matching estimator based on the evolvement of family firms to non-family 
firms, we apply a matching estimator on another treatment: the exit of the last founding 
family member from the firm’s management board. This is especially promising since our 
prior analyses show that the involvement of founding family members in the management 
board has a strong (negative) influence on leverage. The matching estimator is constructed in 
a very similar way as described above. However, we first consider only those family firms 
fulfilling the family management characteristics at any time during our sample period. In a 
                                                 
28 Cf. Klasa (2007) for a similar use of treatment in the construction of a matching estimator. Klasa (2007) uses 
this procedure to study what shapes the founding families’ decision to finally sell their remaining ownership 
stake within the family business. 
29 Cf. also Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), Heckman et al. (1998) or Todd (2006) for a further description of the 
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second step, we identify those firms in which the founding family leaves the management 
board during our sample period and use this “exit” as the treatment variable. Propensity score 
calculation and measurement of changes in the book leverage are equal to the estimator for 
the evolvement of family firms to non-family firms. As expected, we find a positive average 
treatment effect on the treated (ATT) with a coefficient of 0.111. The corresponding t-value is 
2.42, with similar results obtained from bootstrapped standard errors.  
These results strongly support our prior results: Family firms evolving to non-family 
firms significantly change their capital structure. In fact, leverage ratios increase significantly 
after some time period necessary for adjustment of capital structure. A similar effect is 
observed for the withdrawals of founding family members from the management board. 
Overall, this robustness test suggests a significant, negative and causal relationship between 
family firm characteristics (especially family management) and the level of leverage.




With a large sample of German CDAX firms in the period 1995 to 2006 we show that 
even in listed firms the founding families continue to remain an important shareholder and in 
many cases are still involved in supervisory and management board activities. Among 660 
industrial CDAX firms in our sample 390 qualify at least in one sample year as a family firm. 
Those figures underline the importance of listed family firms in Germany.  
We further investigate whether these family firms differ from their non-family 
counterparts in terms of capital structure decisions. Thereby, we are able to add one small 
piece to the “capital structure puzzle” by using the institutional differences between family 
firms and non-family firms in order to show how agency costs affect the firm’s capital 
structure. In fact, by considering three different components of family firms (ownership, 
supervisory and management board activities of the founding family) we find that - as 
predicted by theory - the level of leverage is the lowest if the founding family is both a large 
shareholder and present in the management board at a time. In general, we can show that 
family firms use less debt (measured by several definitions of leverage) than their non-family 
counterparts. In this sense, our analysis contributes to an ongoing discussion, since previous 
research on family firms and leverage mainly focused on market-based economies and was 
inconclusive. In this regard, to our best knowledge we provide the first study investigating 
capital structure decisions in family firms for a bank-based economy. Our results are robust to 
a battery of robustness tests, including misspecification issues, timing effects, insider 
ownership explanations and non-linear size effects. Finally, we use a matching estimator to 
alleviate concerns of endogeneity. Overall, our study suggests a strong, negative and causal 
relationship between family firm characteristics (especially family management) and the level 
of leverage.  
  Although the result of lower leverage ratios within German family firms is very 
robust, the interpretation of these results is complex. As pointed out above, one reasonable 
explanation is related to agency costs considerations. Family firms have lower agency costs 
and thus the disciplinary effect of debt as proposed by Jensen (1986) becomes less relevant. 
However, several alternative explanations are possible: (i) the lower leverage might indicate 
that family firms have lower target debt ratios, e.g. because the founding family has a 
different perception concerning the costs and benefits of debt in comparison to shareholders 
and management in non-family firms. For example, with relation to their largely undiversified 
portfolios the founding family might emphasize the risk of default within their capital 
                                                 
30 Just recently, Lemmon et al. (2009, p. 1576) conclude that “leverage ratios are remarkably stable over time”. 
Against this background the observed changes in capital structure on this large scale around our treatment events 
is especially interesting and a strong sign for the causal effects of family firm characteristics on capital structure 
decisions.   24
structure decisions. (ii) Another potential reason for a lower level of leverage can be related to 
profitability. If – as several different studies indicate (e.g. Anderson and Reeb 2003a, 
Villalonga and Amit 2006, Andres 2008 for Germany) – family firms are indeed more 
profitable than their non-family counterparts, then they might have better capabilities to 
generate internal funds and constant cash-flows. Hence, they are less dependent on external 
finance (both debt and equity). While explanation (i) is related to the trade-off theory of 
capital structure, explanation (ii) is related to the pecking order theory. Other potential reasons 
include (iii) a motivation to avoid a loss of control (as argued by Mishra and McConaughy 
1999) in the context of close creditor monitoring within a bank-based economy, or (iv) a 
restricted access to debt markets due to their family firm characteristics.  
  Some important questions are left for further research: A recently emerged strand in 
capital structure research focuses on dynamic capital structure adjustment. So far we did not 
study whether family firms differ from non-family firms in terms of how they adjust their 
capital structure.
31 While our study helps to shed more light on an issue with so far limited 
and inconclusive empirical evidence – overall differences between family and non-family 
firms in terms of overall leverage – the interpretation of our results remains a demanding task. 
However, this provides a fruitful avenue for further research. To gain more insight into this 
complex issue, survey evidence among CFOs of listed firms might be reasonable to illuminate 
the motivation for lower leverage within German family firms. Of course, another natural 
avenue for future research is to extend the analysis to the large number of private family firms 
in Germany. Finally, there might be other interesting corporate policy choices which are 




                                                 
31 Several recent studies analysed the issue of dynamic capital structure adjustment in greater detail, see for 
example Leary and Roberts (2005), Liu (2005), Flannery and Rangan (2006), Hovakimian (2006) or Kayhan and 
Titman (2007). We plan to incorporate an analysis whether family firms differ from non-family firms in terms of 
dynamic capital structure adjustment in a future version of this paper. Thereby, this will be another major 
contribution since no other study so far covered the issue of target capital structure adjustment in the context of 
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1995 230 65 165
1996 235 68 167
1997 250 75 175
1998 312 111 201
1999 430 203 227
2000 566 312 254
2001 568 315 253
2002 542 278 264
2003 514 262 252
2004 500 248 252
2005 494 237 257
2006 494 236 258
5135 2410 2725
Table 1: Composition of sample
Note: This table shows the development of the sample composition over time. Column 1 presents
the 12 sample years between 1995 and 2006, column 2 the number of firms in each year and




Ownership * Management [MB] Interaction term of founding family ownership and family management [MB]
Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) / total assets




Dummy which is one if (a) the cumulative ownership stake of the founding family is at least 25% and/or (b) a member of the founding family 
is represented in either the management or supervisory board
Founding Family Ownership Percentage of stock ownership held by all members of the founding family
Family Management [MB] Equals 1 if a member of the founding family is involved in the management board
Family Management [SB] Equals 1 if a member of the founding family is involved in the supervisory board
Founder CEO
Ln of the number of years since the firm's incorporation
Equals 1 if the firm applies German GAAP and zero if it applies US-GAAP or IFRS
Firm Age [Ln]
Variable name Description of variable
Equals 1 if the CEO is the founder of the firm
Firm Size [Ln] Ln of the firm's number of employees
Residuals' sum of squares from a regression of the individual stock returns on the returns of the market (CDAX) Firm Specific Risk
Tangible assets / Total assets
Market value of the firm / book value of the firm
Total liabilities / (Book value of equity + total liabilities)
Tangible Assets Ratio
Market-to-Book
Equals 1 if the firm went public during 1998 and 2000
Common dividends / net income available to common equity; Equals 1 if calculated payout ratio is below 0 or above  1.
Book Leverage
Median leverage in the firm's industry indicated by the first number of the SIC code for each year (Leverage is defined as for the dependet 
variable in each model)
Long-term Market Leverage
Market Leverage
Inflation rate of the following year
(Total liabilities - provisions - accounts payable - deferred taxes) / (Book value of equity + total liabilities - provisions - accounts payable - 
deferred taxes)
(Total liabilities - current liabilities) / (Book value of equity + total liabilities)
(Total liabilities - current liabilities) / (Market value of equity + total liabilities)
Total liabilities / (Market value of equity + total liabilities)
Table 2: Definition of Variables
Control Variables
Capital Structure Variables







Long-term Book LeverageMean Median Mean Median Mean Median t-test
Corporate Governance Aspects
Founding Family Ownership [%] 17.90 0 37.71 40.05 0.63 0 29.25
Outside Blockholders [%] 33.73 20.3 15.23 5.50 50.0 51.0 -16.97
Size Management Board 3.16 3 2.94 3 3.34 3 -3.34
Size Supervisory Board 7.56 6 5.32 3 9.54 8 -11.58
Firm Size and age
Assets (in million €) 2,988.08 142.74 996.62 74.67 4,757.64 310.49 -3.30
Sales (in million €) 2,501.35 167.39 1,121.77 80.38 3,735.04 369.07 -3.24
Employees 11,379 1023 6,324 428 15,863 2159 -2.65
Firm Age 52.97 28 31.18 15 72.42 74 -10.79
IPO Age 14.62 6 5.91 4 22.38 11 -12.34
Accounting figures
Profitability -0.07 0.11 0.10 0.09 -0.27 0.11 -1.19
Tangible Assets Ratio 0.23 0.20 0.20 0.15 0.26 0.24 -4.81
Market-to-Book 2.86 1.73 3.08 1.74 2.66 1.72 0.72
Dummy Accounting Standard 0.46 0.00 0.32 0.00 0.58 1.00 -8.85
Payout ratio 0.27 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.32 0.19 -5.11
Dependent variables
Book Leverage 0.56 0.59 0.49 0.50 0.62 0.66 -9.27
Market Leverage 0.47 0.46 0.36 0.39 0.54 0.53 -8.32
Long-term Book Leverage 0.26 0.25 0.20 0.17 0.32 0.31 -9.53
Long-term Market Leverage 0.22 0.20 0.16 0.12 0.26 0.25 -9.59
Financial Book Leverage 0.48 0.48 0.43 0.41 0.51 0.53 -4.18
Financial Market Leverage 0.35 0.37 0.28 0.33 0.39 0.41 -3.88
Note: Accounting information is obtained from Thomson's Worldscope Database. Information on ownership structure is hand-collected from the Hoppenstedt Stock Guide. The sample consists of all non-financial firms in the broadest German stock Index
(CDAX) between 1995 and 2006. Firms are classified as family firms if the founding family has an ownership stake of at least 25% and/or a member of the founding family participates in the management or supervisory board. ***, ** and * indicate
significance on the 1%-, 5%- and 10%-level respectively. The t-statistics are corrected for serial correlation. A detailed definition of all variables can be found in table 2.
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
All Firms Family Firms Non-Family FirmsModel I a I b I c II a II b II c III a III b III c IV a IV b IV c
OLS Between Within OLS Between Within OLS Between Within OLS Between Within
Dummy Family Firm -0.041*** -0.049** -0.019
(-2.62) (-2.46) (-1.04)
Family Ownership -0.046 -0.066 -0.051*
(-1.44) (-1.58) (-1.70)
Family Management [MB] -0.042** -0.043* -0.023
(-2.43) (-1.95) (-1.13)
Family Management [SB] 0.0029 0.011 0.018
(0.16) (0.49) (1.19)
Founder CEO -0.061*** -0.075*** -0.047**
(-2.89) (-3.44) (-2.14)
Ownership * Management [MB] -0.11*** -0.12*** -0.086***
(-3.18) (-2.91) (-2.62)
Firm Size [Ln] 0.039*** 0.044*** 0.045*** 0.038*** 0.043*** 0.045*** 0.038*** 0.040*** 0.043*** 0.039*** 0.044*** 0.045***
(9.96) (8.73) (5.13) (9.51) (8.56) (5.20) (9.31) (7.72) (4.33) (9.77) (8.91) (5.18)
Profitability -0.00017*** 0.00023 -0.00036*** -0.00020*** 0.00015 -0.00035*** -0.00021*** 0.000075 -0.00036*** -0.00021*** 0.00013 -0.00035***
(-3.93) (0.44) (-6.62) (-4.17) (0.29) (-6.52) (-4.31) (0.14) (-7.42) (-4.51) (0.24) (-6.43)
Outside Blockholders -0.0080 -0.061** -0.012 -0.015 -0.068** -0.016 -0.00072 -0.058** -0.0043 -0.0094 -0.058** -0.016
(-0.39) (-2.06) (-0.64) (-0.74) (-2.22) (-0.83) (-0.037) (-2.04) (-0.22) (-0.50) (-2.05) (-0.84)
Firm Specific Risk 0.11*** 0.15*** 0.055*** 0.11*** 0.15*** 0.055*** 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.061*** 0.11*** 0.15*** 0.053**
(4.23) (4.00) (2.70) (4.14) (4.13) (2.66) (3.86) (3.58) (2.80) (4.09) (4.06) (2.57)
Firm Age [Ln] 0.0080 0.0048 0.047*** 0.0062 0.0032 0.045** 0.0049 0.0021 0.036* 0.0080 0.0046 0.043**
(1.19) (0.62) (2.59) (0.92) (0.42) (2.46) (0.69) (0.26) (1.92) (1.20) (0.61) (2.34)
Tangible Assets Ratio 0.12*** 0.11** 0.26*** 0.13*** 0.11** 0.27*** 0.100** 0.087 0.25*** 0.12*** 0.11** 0.26***
(2.92) (2.07) (5.67) (3.00) (2.15) (5.74) (2.33) (1.57) (5.18) (2.94) (2.03) (5.60)
Market-to-Book 0.0011*** 0.0024*** 0.00089*** 0.0011*** 0.0023*** 0.00088*** 0.0011*** 0.0023** 0.00086*** 0.0010*** 0.0023*** 0.00088***
(6.53) (2.73) (7.36) (6.44) (2.68) (7.18) (5.57) (2.54) (6.46) (6.69) (2.61) (7.16)
Dummy Accounting Standard 0.078*** 0.11*** 0.044*** 0.078*** 0.11*** 0.043*** 0.076*** 0.088*** 0.044*** 0.081*** 0.11*** 0.043***
(5.37) (3.70) (4.45) (5.40) (3.73) (4.36) (5.04) (3.06) (4.26) (5.67) (4.03) (4.35)
Payout Ratio -0.033** -0.024 -0.028*** -0.031** -0.021 -0.027*** -0.032** -0.019 -0.027*** -0.031** -0.024 -0.027***
(-2.46) (-0.65) (-3.44) (-2.34) (-0.56) (-3.45) (-2.29) (-0.50) (-3.09) (-2.37) (-0.64) (-3.52)
Median Industry Leverage 0.30*** 0.41 0.33*** 0.30*** 0.42 0.33*** 0.30*** 0.61* 0.31*** 0.30*** 0.48 0.33***
(2.81) (1.26) (4.00) (2.84) (1.28) (3.99) (2.73) (1.84) (3.62) (2.88) (1.46) (4.03)
Expected Inflation Rate 0.029** 0.046 0.030*** 0.027** 0.046 0.027** 0.030** 0.027 0.030** 0.027** 0.047 0.028**
(2.41) (0.45) (2.66) (2.21) (0.45) (2.39) (2.34) (0.30) (2.49) (2.25) (0.47) (2.44)
Constant -0.030 -0.23 -0.25** -0.0086 -0.22 -0.23** -0.0063 -0.22 -0.19* -0.030 -0.29 -0.23**
(-0.27) (-0.61) (-2.44) (-0.076) (-0.59) (-2.25) (-0.055) (-0.63) (-1.65) (-0.27) (-0.78) (-2.19)
Observations 3746 3746 3746 3746 3746 3746 3449 3449 3449 3746 3746 3746
Number of clusters 589 589 589 589 589 589 566 566 566 589 589 589
Adj. R-squared  0.28 0.35 0.81 0.28 0.36 0.81 0.29 0.35 0.82 0.28 0.36 0.81
Model OLS BE FE OLS BE FE OLS BE FE OLS BE FE
Note: A detailed description of the variables can be found in table 2. OLS is a pooled OLS regresion model, BE is a "between" effects panel model and FE is a "within" effects panel model. Time and industry dummies are included.The standard errors of the
coefficientsare correctedfor serial correlationon a firm leveland for heteroscedasticityusing the Huber-White-Sandwichestimator based on White (1980). T-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***,** and * indicatesignificanceon the 1%-, 5%- and 10%-level
respectively.
Table 4: Book LeverageModel I a I b I c II a II b II c III a III b III c IV a IV b IV c
OLS Between Within OLS Between Within OLS Between Within OLS Between Within
Dummy Family Firm -0.060*** -0.073*** -0.017
(-3.16) (-3.42) (-0.87)
Family Ownership -0.054 -0.064 -0.040
(-1.49) (-1.44) (-1.24)
Family Management [MB] -0.048** -0.052** -0.048**
(-2.46) (-2.19) (-2.38)
Family Management [SB] -0.019 -0.013 -0.00017
(-0.91) (-0.53) (-0.0094)
Founder CEO -0.059** -0.079*** -0.017
(-2.58) (-3.36) (-0.81)
Ownership * Management [MB] -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.11***
(-3.06) (-2.84) (-3.43)
Firm Size [Ln] 0.029*** 0.035*** 0.046*** 0.028*** 0.035*** 0.047*** 0.028*** 0.032*** 0.041*** 0.029*** 0.037*** 0.046***
(6.02) (6.60) (5.79) (5.72) (6.50) (6.02) (5.41) (5.78) (4.44) (5.90) (6.93) (5.81)
Profitability -0.000080 0.00044 -0.00034*** -0.000098 0.00039 -0.00033*** -0.00012 0.00034 -0.00033*** -0.00012 0.00035 -0.00033***
(-0.93) (0.79) (-4.10) (-1.13) (0.69) (-4.03) (-1.37) (0.59) (-4.45) (-1.37) (0.63) (-3.92)
Outside Blockholders -0.034 -0.10*** -0.040** -0.041 -0.11*** -0.047** -0.016 -0.070** -0.032 -0.025 -0.086*** -0.046**
(-1.35) (-3.23) (-2.00) (-1.62) (-3.21) (-2.28) (-0.65) (-2.32) (-1.52) (-1.06) (-2.79) (-2.28)
Firm Specific Risk 0.14*** 0.16*** 0.062*** 0.13*** 0.16*** 0.061*** 0.14*** 0.16*** 0.062*** 0.13*** 0.17*** 0.060***
(4.63) (4.17) (2.93) (4.50) (4.12) (2.87) (4.04) (4.29) (2.65) (4.44) (4.21) (2.82)
Firm Age [Ln] 0.0097 -0.0028 0.083*** 0.0088 -0.0036 0.080*** 0.0096 -0.0051 0.080*** 0.011 -0.0020 0.078***
(1.28) (-0.33) (4.09) (1.16) (-0.42) (3.94) (1.21) (-0.59) (3.68) (1.43) (-0.25) (3.84)
Tangible Assets Ratio 0.24*** 0.22*** 0.31*** 0.25*** 0.22*** 0.30*** 0.23*** 0.25*** 0.30*** 0.24*** 0.21*** 0.30***
(5.15) (3.91) (6.25) (5.21) (3.95) (6.21) (4.63) (4.31) (5.86) (5.12) (3.80) (6.08)
Market-to-Book -0.00041 -0.0019* -0.000080 -0.00040 -0.0019* -0.000072 -0.00033 -0.0017 -0.000063 -0.00042 -0.0020* -0.000082
(-0.90) (-1.69) (-0.37) (-0.89) (-1.67) (-0.34) (-0.69) (-1.57) (-0.26) (-0.91) (-1.79) (-0.39)
Dummy Accounting Standard 0.076*** 0.11*** 0.017 0.076*** 0.11*** 0.015 0.072*** 0.087*** 0.018 0.079*** 0.12*** 0.015
(4.34) (3.66) (1.51) (4.36) (3.76) (1.32) (3.90) (2.87) (1.50) (4.62) (4.09) (1.34)
Payout Ratio -0.025 -0.040 -0.014 -0.024 -0.040 -0.012 -0.024 -0.031 -0.013 -0.024 -0.040 -0.012
(-1.61) (-0.97) (-1.45) (-1.54) (-0.97) (-1.32) (-1.38) (-0.75) (-1.30) (-1.53) (-0.97) (-1.34)
Median Industry Leverage 0.54*** 0.70** 0.43*** 0.54*** 0.72** 0.42*** 0.56*** 0.86*** 0.44*** 0.55*** 0.76** 0.43***
(6.56) (2.14) (5.36) (6.52) (2.19) (5.27) (6.58) (2.64) (5.34) (6.58) (2.33) (5.31)
Expected Inflation Rate 0.042*** -0.036 0.020* 0.040*** -0.032 0.015 0.043*** -0.065 0.023** 0.041*** -0.032 0.016
(3.55) (-0.32) (1.79) (3.31) (-0.28) (1.30) (3.40) (-0.68) (2.00) (3.39) (-0.28) (1.41)
Constant -0.22** -0.25 -0.48*** -0.20* -0.27 -0.45*** -0.23** -0.24 -0.45*** -0.23** -0.34 -0.45***
(-2.04) (-0.65) (-4.93) (-1.81) (-0.70) (-4.58) (-2.04) (-0.68) (-4.28) (-2.15) (-0.89) (-4.62)
Observations 3859 3859 3859 3859 3859 3859 3547 3547 3547 3859 3859 3859
Number of clusters 591 591 591 591 591 591 571 571 571 591 591 591
Adj. R-squared  0.26 0.32 0.80 0.26 0.31 0.80 0.26 0.31 0.81 0.25 0.31 0.80
Model OLS BE FE OLS BE FE OLS BE FE OLS BE FE
Note: A detailed description of the variables can be found in table 2. OLS is a pooled OLS regresion model, BE is a "between" effects panel model and FE is a "within" effects panel model. Time and industry dummies are included.The standard errors of the
coefficientsare correctedfor serial correlationon a firm leveland for heteroscedasticityusing the Huber-White-Sandwichestimator based on White (1980). T-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***,** and * indicatesignificanceon the 1%-, 5%- and 10%-level
respectively.
Table 5: Market LeverageModel I a I b I c II a II b II c III a III b III c IV a IV b IV c
OLS Between Within OLS Between Within OLS Between Within OLS Between Within
Dummy Family Firm -0.036*** -0.051*** -0.023*
(-3.10) (-3.89) (-1.68)
Family Ownership -0.0067 -0.012 -0.039*
(-0.32) (-0.42) (-1.80)
Family Management [MB] -0.052*** -0.053*** -0.039**
(-3.98) (-3.52) (-2.29)
Family Management [SB] 0.0021 -0.0046 -0.0090
(0.18) (-0.31) (-0.76)
Founder CEO -0.048*** -0.051*** -0.044**
(-3.33) (-3.36) (-2.40)
Ownership * Management [MB] -0.085*** -0.075*** -0.082***
(-3.58) (-2.70) (-2.72)
Firm Size [Ln] 0.020*** 0.024*** -0.0063 0.019*** 0.023*** -0.0053 0.020*** 0.023*** -0.0035 0.020*** 0.025*** -0.0064
(6.95) (7.00) (-0.95) (6.52) (6.89) (-0.82) (7.18) (6.54) (-0.49) (6.97) (7.48) (-0.99)
Profitability -0.00035*** -0.00026 -0.00047*** -0.00037*** -0.00029 -0.00046*** -0.00037*** -0.00030 -0.00048*** -0.00038*** -0.00030 -0.00046***
(-12.4) (-0.75) (-12.2) (-12.5) (-0.84) (-12.2) (-11.7) (-0.84) (-12.2) (-12.7) (-0.88) (-12.0)
Outside Blockholders 0.024 -0.0070 0.015 0.024 -0.0015 0.0089 0.028* 0.016 0.013 0.026* 0.0076 0.013
(1.60) (-0.35) (0.85) (1.56) (-0.075) (0.50) (1.95) (0.85) (0.75) (1.78) (0.39) (0.73)
Firm Specific Risk 0.051*** 0.085*** 0.026*** 0.050*** 0.082*** 0.026*** 0.051*** 0.082*** 0.026** 0.049*** 0.086*** 0.025***
(4.66) (3.26) (2.92) (4.60) (3.16) (2.83) (4.49) (3.40) (2.31) (4.55) (3.27) (2.77)
Firm Age [Ln] 0.0051 0.00033 0.021 0.0027 -0.00091 0.018 0.0028 -0.00028 0.0053 0.0053 0.0018 0.017
(0.90) (0.064) (1.30) (0.47) (-0.17) (1.10) (0.47) (-0.053) (0.33) (0.93) (0.36) (1.04)
Tangible Assets Ratio 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.29*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.29*** 0.27*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.27*** 0.29***
(8.69) (7.91) (6.37) (8.87) (7.93) (6.35) (8.25) (7.87) (5.85) (8.82) (7.74) (6.28)
Market-to-Book 0.00016 -0.00011 0.00011 0.00017 -0.000054 0.00012 0.00017 -0.00049 0.00012 0.00016 -0.00016 0.00011
(0.74) (-0.16) (0.97) (0.82) (-0.082) (1.04) (0.69) (-0.79) (1.04) (0.68) (-0.25) (0.94)
Dummy Accounting Standard 0.083*** 0.087*** 0.067*** 0.081*** 0.087*** 0.065*** 0.083*** 0.088*** 0.069*** 0.085*** 0.095*** 0.066***
(7.49) (4.84) (7.06) (7.44) (4.79) (6.96) (7.05) (4.80) (7.30) (7.87) (5.30) (7.02)
Payout Ratio -0.029*** -0.036 -0.020** -0.029*** -0.041 -0.018** -0.028** -0.039 -0.016* -0.028*** -0.036 -0.019**
(-2.66) (-1.41) (-2.56) (-2.65) (-1.61) (-2.46) (-2.47) (-1.54) (-1.96) (-2.59) (-1.42) (-2.51)
Median Industry Leverage 0.31*** 0.58 0.19** 0.31*** 0.60* 0.19** 0.31*** 0.73** 0.19** 0.31*** 0.64* 0.20**
(3.07) (1.63) (2.30) (3.01) (1.68) (2.31) (2.90) (2.12) (2.19) (3.09) (1.79) (2.37)
Expected Inflation Rate 0.018* -0.030 0.0084 0.016* -0.030 0.0053 0.021** -0.062 0.015 0.017* -0.024 0.0067
(1.93) (-0.45) (0.89) (1.73) (-0.46) (0.57) (2.15) (-1.06) (1.56) (1.86) (-0.37) (0.72)
Constant -0.16*** -0.14 0.078 -0.14** -0.14 0.099 -0.16*** -0.060 0.10 -0.17*** -0.19 0.096
(-2.94) (-0.80) (1.03) (-2.50) (-0.76) (1.30) (-2.94) (-0.37) (1.32) (-3.15) (-1.10) (1.26)
Observations 3492 3492 3492 3492 3492 3492 3214 3214 3214 3492 3492 3492
Number of clusters 565 565 565 565 565 565 545 545 545 565 565 565
Adj. R-squared  0.35 0.47 0.75 0.36 0.47 0.75 0.36 0.46 0.75 0.35 0.46 0.75
Model OLS BE FE OLS BE FE OLS BE FE OLS BE FE
Note: A detailed description of the variables can be found in table 2. OLS is a pooled OLS regresion model, BE is a "between" effects panel model and FE is a "within" effects panel model. Time and industry dummies are included.The standard errors of the
coefficientsare correctedfor serial correlationon a firm leveland for heteroscedasticityusing the Huber-White-Sandwichestimator based on White (1980). T-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***,** and * indicatesignificanceon the 1%-, 5%- and 10%-level
respectively.
Table 6: Long-term Book LeverageModel I a I b I c II a II b II c III a III b III c IV a IV b IV c
OLS Between Within OLS Between Within OLS Between Within OLS Between Within
Dummy Family Firm -0.042*** -0.053*** -0.026**
(-3.90) (-4.49) (-2.09)
Family Ownership -0.017 -0.018 -0.027
(-0.87) (-0.73) (-1.16)
Family Management [MB] -0.045*** -0.043*** -0.052***
(-3.75) (-3.18) (-3.32)
Family Management [SB] -0.0067 -0.0080 -0.013
(-0.59) (-0.60) (-1.17)
Founder CEO -0.046*** -0.046*** -0.041***
(-3.39) (-3.44) (-2.59)
Ownership * Management [MB] -0.077*** -0.058** -0.093***
(-3.40) (-2.33) (-3.32)
Firm Size [Ln] 0.016*** 0.020*** 0.0089 0.015*** 0.020*** 0.010* 0.016*** 0.018*** 0.0091 0.016*** 0.021*** 0.0087
(5.70) (6.50) (1.59) (5.34) (6.51) (1.84) (5.61) (5.78) (1.50) (5.73) (7.11) (1.57)
Profitability -0.00024*** -0.00012 -0.00034*** -0.00026*** -0.00015 -0.00033*** -0.00027*** -0.00018 -0.00034*** -0.00027*** -0.00015 -0.00033***
(-7.11) (-0.40) (-11.9) (-7.31) (-0.48) (-11.8) (-7.40) (-0.56) (-11.4) (-7.83) (-0.49) (-11.4)
Outside Blockholders 0.0095 -0.015 -0.0056 0.0099 -0.0084 -0.011 0.018 0.0079 -0.0040 0.017 0.0046 -0.0081
(0.64) (-0.87) (-0.39) (0.66) (-0.45) (-0.74) (1.30) (0.47) (-0.27) (1.19) (0.26) (-0.56)
Firm Specific Risk 0.052*** 0.080*** 0.023*** 0.051*** 0.078*** 0.022*** 0.055*** 0.073*** 0.024** 0.051*** 0.082*** 0.021***
(4.96) (3.42) (2.92) (4.80) (3.33) (2.75) (4.79) (3.41) (2.45) (4.78) (3.46) (2.71)
Firm Age [Ln] 0.0056 0.00038 0.039*** 0.0042 -0.000087 0.035** 0.0042 -0.00043 0.033** 0.0064 0.0022 0.034**
(1.12) (0.083) (2.61) (0.82) (-0.019) (2.36) (0.80) (-0.091) (2.07) (1.28) (0.47) (2.29)
Tangible Assets Ratio 0.29*** 0.28*** 0.27*** 0.29*** 0.28*** 0.26*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.26*** 0.29*** 0.27*** 0.26***
(8.90) (8.91) (5.56) (9.04) (8.85) (5.57) (8.58) (9.17) (5.13) (8.97) (8.62) (5.50)
Market-to-Book -0.00011 -0.00071 -0.000058 -0.00010 -0.00069 -0.000049 -0.000064 -0.00069 -0.000039 -0.00012 -0.00078 -0.000061
(-0.47) (-1.22) (-0.62) (-0.45) (-1.17) (-0.55) (-0.26) (-1.25) (-0.41) (-0.48) (-1.32) (-0.66)
Dummy Accounting Standard 0.066*** 0.075*** 0.044*** 0.065*** 0.076*** 0.042*** 0.065*** 0.068*** 0.044*** 0.069*** 0.084*** 0.043***
(6.18) (4.65) (4.95) (6.18) (4.69) (4.81) (5.73) (4.20) (4.82) (6.55) (5.18) (4.89)
Payout Ratio -0.017* -0.030 -0.0053 -0.016* -0.034 -0.0037 -0.016 -0.036 -0.0030 -0.016 -0.031 -0.0039
(-1.71) (-1.34) (-0.76) (-1.70) (-1.50) (-0.55) (-1.63) (-1.57) (-0.41) (-1.65) (-1.35) (-0.59)
Median Industry Leverage 0.27*** 0.73** 0.20** 0.26*** 0.78** 0.19** 0.34*** 1.10*** 0.22*** 0.27*** 0.79** 0.20**
(3.04) (2.36) (2.56) (2.95) (2.50) (2.40) (3.60) (3.51) (2.67) (2.95) (2.53) (2.46)
Expected Inflation Rate 0.024*** -0.053 0.0084 0.023*** -0.051 0.0046 0.026*** -0.057 0.010 0.023*** -0.049 0.0059
(2.99) (-0.92) (0.98) (2.77) (-0.87) (0.54) (3.02) (-1.10) (1.10) (2.89) (-0.83) (0.69)
Constant -0.15*** -0.089 -0.13** -0.13*** -0.10 -0.11* -0.16*** -0.11 -0.12* -0.16*** -0.15 -0.11*
(-3.18) (-0.57) (-2.07) (-2.80) (-0.66) (-1.67) (-3.49) (-0.76) (-1.79) (-3.56) (-0.94) (-1.68)
Observations 3500 3500 3500 3500 3500 3500 3221 3221 3221 3500 3500 3500
Number of clusters 565 565 565 565 565 565 545 545 545 565 565 565
Adj. R-squared  0.34 0.45 0.75 0.34 0.45 0.75 0.35 0.46 0.75 0.34 0.44 0.75
Model OLS BE FE OLS BE FE OLS BE FE OLS BE FE
Table 7: Long-term Market Leverage
Note: A detailed description of the variables can be found in table 2. OLS is a pooled OLS regresion model, BE is a "between" effects panel model and FE is a "within"effects panel model. Time and industry dummies are included. The standard errors of
the coefficients are corrected for serial correlation on a firm level and for heteroscedasticity using the Huber-White-Sandwichestimator based on White (1980). T-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance on the 1%-, 5%-
and 10%-level respectively.Model I a I b I c II a II b II c III a III b III c IV a IV b IV c
OLS Between Within OLS Between Within OLS Between Within OLS Between Within
Dummy Family Firm -0.019 -0.038 -0.047**
(-0.80) (-1.41) (-1.98)
Family Ownership -0.031 -0.011 -0.061
(-0.72) (-0.20) (-1.55)
Family Management [MB] -0.054** -0.065** -0.036
(-2.06) (-2.10) (-1.28)
Family Management [SB] 0.037 0.024 0.017
(1.63) (0.81) (0.76)
Founder CEO -0.084*** -0.095*** -0.083***
(-2.90) (-3.12) (-3.00)
Ownership * Management [MB] -0.13** -0.090 -0.10**
(-2.53) (-1.54) (-2.36)
Firm Size [Ln] 0.043*** 0.042*** 0.058*** 0.042*** 0.041*** 0.057*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.049*** 0.042*** 0.043*** 0.057***
(7.24) (5.99) (3.95) (6.87) (5.77) (3.87) (6.85) (5.94) (3.56) (7.09) (6.09) (3.80)
Profitability -0.11** 0.084 -0.13*** -0.11** 0.081 -0.13*** -0.13*** 0.054 -0.14*** -0.10** 0.085 -0.13***
(-2.23) (1.18) (-4.24) (-2.24) (1.14) (-4.08) (-2.66) (0.68) (-4.08) (-2.10) (1.19) (-4.02)
Outside Blockholders -0.034 -0.11*** -0.013 -0.039 -0.10*** -0.015 -0.041 -0.10*** -0.0061 -0.048* -0.099*** -0.012
(-1.12) (-2.73) (-0.56) (-1.26) (-2.69) (-0.64) (-1.46) (-2.89) (-0.27) (-1.70) (-2.74) (-0.51)
Firm Specific Risk 0.16*** 0.16** 0.065** 0.16*** 0.16** 0.066** 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.070** 0.16*** 0.16** 0.062**
(4.66) (2.46) (2.55) (4.66) (2.46) (2.59) (4.49) (2.77) (2.51) (4.66) (2.46) (2.48)
Firm Age [Ln] 0.00064 -0.0033 0.056* -0.0040 -0.0070 0.054* -0.0048 -0.0047 0.055* -0.0022 -0.0038 0.052*
(0.069) (-0.33) (1.86) (-0.43) (-0.69) (1.84) (-0.50) (-0.46) (1.96) (-0.24) (-0.38) (1.73)
Tangible Assets Ratio 0.11* 0.14* 0.34*** 0.11* 0.13* 0.34*** 0.097 0.12 0.32*** 0.11* 0.14* 0.33***
(1.72) (1.87) (3.83) (1.68) (1.81) (3.81) (1.50) (1.59) (3.78) (1.71) (1.92) (3.71)
Market-to-Book 0.0018*** 0.0038** 0.0014*** 0.0018*** 0.0038** 0.0014*** 0.0018*** 0.0040** 0.0014*** 0.0018*** 0.0035* 0.0014***
(3.28) (1.99) (3.75) (3.20) (1.97) (3.65) (3.70) (2.09) (3.85) (3.18) (1.81) (3.68)
Dummy Accounting Standard 0.053** 0.050 0.0071 0.053** 0.049 0.0055 0.054** 0.060 0.0078 0.055** 0.054 0.0052
(2.27) (1.30) (0.53) (2.30) (1.27) (0.42) (2.27) (1.52) (0.60) (2.36) (1.42) (0.40)
Payout Ratio 0.0012 -0.022 -0.012 0.0071 -0.017 -0.011 0.0011 -0.020 -0.0080 0.0059 -0.022 -0.012
(0.050) (-0.47) (-1.01) (0.30) (-0.36) (-0.91) (0.046) (-0.43) (-0.67) (0.25) (-0.47) (-0.95)
Median Industry Leverage 0.54*** 0.86*** 0.45*** 0.52*** 0.85*** 0.44*** 0.57*** 1.11*** 0.45*** 0.52*** 0.87*** 0.44***
(6.12) (2.74) (6.95) (5.88) (2.71) (6.73) (7.14) (3.40) (7.21) (6.01) (2.76) (6.71)
Expected Inflation Rate 0.050*** 0.20** 0.025 0.047** 0.20** 0.021 0.058*** 0.22** 0.032** 0.047** 0.20** 0.022
(2.74) (2.19) (1.64) (2.52) (2.20) (1.35) (3.14) (2.43) (2.10) (2.53) (2.11) (1.45)
Constant -0.31*** -0.88*** -0.50*** -0.27** -0.85*** -0.48*** -0.30*** -1.01*** -0.45*** -0.27** -0.88*** -0.47***
(-2.88) (-2.86) (-3.22) (-2.34) (-2.75) (-3.11) (-2.72) (-3.22) (-2.95) (-2.43) (-2.84) (-3.05)
Observations 2035 2035 2035 2035 2035 2035 1934 1934 1934 2035 2035 2035
Number of clusters 391 391 391 391 391 391 378 378 378 391 391 391
Adj. R-squared  0.18 0.23 0.83 0.19 0.24 0.83 0.21 0.26 0.84 0.19 0.23 0.83
Model OLS BE FE OLS BE FE OLS BE FE OLS BE FE
Table 8: Financial Book Leverage
Note: A detailed description of the variables can be found in table 2. OLS is a pooled OLS regresion model, BE is a "between" effects panel model and FE is a "within" effects panel model. Time and industry dummies are included.The standard errors of the
coefficientsare correctedfor serial correlationon a firm leveland for heteroscedasticityusing the Huber-White-Sandwichestimator based on White (1980). T-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***,** and * indicatesignificanceon the 1%-, 5%- and 10%-level
respectively.Model I a I b I c II a II b II c III a III b III c IV a IV b IV c
OLS Between Within OLS Between Within OLS Between Within OLS Between Within
Dummy Family Firm -0.040 -0.048* -0.035
(-1.52) (-1.74) (-1.40)
Family Ownership -0.030 -0.024 0.0092
(-0.65) (-0.43) (0.21)
Family Management [MB] -0.045* -0.042 -0.060**
(-1.68) (-1.37) (-2.24)
Family Management [SB] -0.00092 -0.0097 -0.0034
(-0.038) (-0.32) (-0.14)
Founder CEO -0.073*** -0.085*** -0.062**
(-2.61) (-2.77) (-2.08)
Ownership * Management [MB] -0.100* -0.084 -0.060
(-1.89) (-1.43) (-1.32)
Firm Size [Ln] 0.030*** 0.032*** 0.048*** 0.029*** 0.031*** 0.049*** 0.029*** 0.031*** 0.041*** 0.030*** 0.033*** 0.047***
(4.49) (4.41) (3.37) (4.28) (4.31) (3.43) (4.32) (4.21) (2.96) (4.47) (4.59) (3.25)
Profitability -0.22*** -0.024 -0.20*** -0.22*** -0.026 -0.20*** -0.27*** -0.083 -0.23*** -0.22*** -0.025 -0.20***
(-4.18) (-0.36) (-6.26) (-4.18) (-0.39) (-6.14) (-4.49) (-1.17) (-6.57) (-4.17) (-0.37) (-6.16)
Outside Blockholders -0.050 -0.10*** -0.050** -0.052 -0.10** -0.050** -0.043 -0.094** -0.045** -0.046 -0.088** -0.049**
(-1.58) (-2.62) (-2.22) (-1.65) (-2.54) (-2.11) (-1.44) (-2.57) (-2.03) (-1.59) (-2.41) (-2.17)
Firm Specific Risk 0.20*** 0.19*** 0.056** 0.20*** 0.18*** 0.058** 0.19*** 0.17*** 0.058** 0.19*** 0.18*** 0.053**
(4.89) (2.85) (2.44) (4.85) (2.78) (2.52) (4.60) (2.63) (2.37) (4.81) (2.81) (2.35)
Firm Age [Ln] 0.0062 0.0018 0.094*** 0.0038 0.00044 0.090*** 0.0025 0.00034 0.092*** 0.0054 0.0018 0.092***
(0.70) (0.18) (2.91) (0.42) (0.043) (2.84) (0.28) (0.033) (2.90) (0.61) (0.18) (2.85)
Tangible Assets Ratio 0.17** 0.20*** 0.32*** 0.17** 0.20*** 0.31*** 0.16** 0.20*** 0.31*** 0.17** 0.20*** 0.31***
(2.40) (2.68) (3.96) (2.39) (2.66) (3.84) (2.26) (2.65) (3.98) (2.38) (2.72) (3.85)
Market-to-Book -0.00092 -0.0042*** 0.00022 -0.00087 -0.0040** 0.00027 -0.00081 -0.0033** 0.00026 -0.00095 -0.0043*** 0.00023
(-1.10) (-2.66) (0.95) (-1.04) (-2.51) (1.20) (-0.98) (-2.16) (1.16) (-1.14) (-2.72) (1.00)
Dummy Accounting Standard 0.050** 0.062 -0.012 0.050** 0.063* -0.014 0.048* 0.061 -0.0084 0.052** 0.067* -0.013
(2.08) (1.64) (-0.83) (2.09) (1.67) (-0.93) (1.94) (1.57) (-0.57) (2.16) (1.76) (-0.87)
Payout Ratio 0.00073 -0.077 0.00088 0.0029 -0.078 0.00076 0.0049 -0.072 0.0092 0.0033 -0.078 0.0012
(0.031) (-1.61) (0.059) (0.12) (-1.61) (0.052) (0.21) (-1.49) (0.67) (0.14) (-1.63) (0.080)
Median Industry Leverage 0.55*** 1.10*** 0.38*** 0.54*** 1.10*** 0.38*** 0.51*** 1.08*** 0.35*** 0.54*** 1.10*** 0.38***
(5.92) (3.07) (6.54) (5.80) (3.08) (6.45) (5.57) (3.08) (6.24) (5.87) (3.10) (6.43)
Expected Inflation Rate 0.032* 0.21** -0.011 0.031* 0.21** -0.012 0.039** 0.22** -0.0021 0.030* 0.20** -0.012
(1.83) (2.29) (-0.86) (1.74) (2.22) (-0.92) (2.19) (2.39) (-0.16) (1.69) (2.12) (-0.92)
Constant -0.21* -0.98*** -0.50*** -0.19 -0.96*** -0.49*** -0.18 -0.92*** -0.46*** -0.20* -0.96*** -0.49***
(-1.75) (-3.30) (-3.19) (-1.52) (-3.22) (-3.11) (-1.46) (-3.17) (-2.94) (-1.68) (-3.25) (-3.09)
Observations 2088 2088 2088 2088 2088 2088 1985 1985 1985 2088 2088 2088
Number of clusters 393 393 393 393 393 393 380 380 380 393 393 393
Adj. R-squared  0.21 0.23 0.83 0.21 0.22 0.83 0.22 0.23 0.84 0.21 0.23 0.83
Model OLS BE FE OLS BE FE OLS BE FE OLS BE FE
Note: A detailed description of the variables can be found in table 2. OLS is a pooled OLS regresion model, BE is a "between" effects panel model and FE is a "within" effects panel model. Time and industry dummies are included.The standard errors of the
coefficientsare correctedfor serial correlationon a firm leveland for heteroscedasticityusing the Huber-White-Sandwichestimator based on White (1980). T-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***,** and * indicatesignificanceon the 1%-, 5%- and 10%-level
respectively.
Table 9: Financial Market LeverageLagged variables
Dummy IPO Dummy IPO IPO 98 - 00 IPO before/after 95 - 00 01 - 06 Firm Size^2 Small firms Large firms Winsorizing (2.5%) 1-year lag No IO <10%
Dummy Family Firm -0.058*** -0.096*** -0.067** -0.083*** -0.067*** -0.061*** -0.059** -0.067*** -0.050*** -0.049** -0.065** -0.079***
(-3.04) (-2.96) (-2.44) (-3.65) (-2.76) (-3.21) (-2.40) (-2.75) (-2.98) (-2.38) (-2.16) (-2.98)
Dummy High Tech Firm -0.038 -0.043*
(-1.64) (-1.83)
Firm Size ^ 2 -0.00076
(-0.73)
Firm Size [Ln] 0.027*** 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.044*** 0.036*** 0.031*** 0.040** 0.037*** 0.031*** 0.039*** 0.026*** 0.039*** 0.038***
(5.36) (5.65) (2.97) (6.74) (6.24) (5.14) (2.48) (6.05) (3.48) (8.91) (5.26) (6.25) (6.34)
Profitability -0.000080 -0.000075 0.00052 -0.56*** 0.00018 -0.18*** -0.000076 -0.72*** -0.00015** -0.27*** -0.027 -0.30*** -0.18***
(-0.94) (-0.89) (0.90) (-4.98) (0.58) (-4.42) (-0.89) (-7.51) (-2.38) (-6.48) (-1.49) (-4.08) (-3.60)
Outside Blockholders -0.036 -0.0026 -0.13** -0.090** -0.12*** -0.025 -0.035 -0.021 -0.034 -0.023 -0.033 -0.037 -0.037
(-1.44) (-0.11) (-2.26) (-2.38) (-3.47) (-0.74) (-1.40) (-0.77) (-0.92) (-1.08) (-1.23) (-1.10) (-1.17)
Firm Specific Risk 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.092* 0.27*** 0.20*** 0.030 0.14*** 0.29*** 0.073*** 0.19*** 0.11*** 0.087*** 0.10***
(4.61) (4.45) (1.86) (3.78) (4.79) (0.64) (4.65) (6.38) (4.10) (7.37) (4.29) (2.94) (2.98)
Firm Age [Ln] 0.0056 0.0086 0.0010 -0.0098 0.0075 0.0038 0.0095 0.0085 0.028** 0.010 0.0010 -0.0020 -0.0023
(0.72) (1.12) (0.081) (-0.87) (0.83) (0.45) (1.26) (0.98) (2.40) (1.43) (0.13) (-0.20) (-0.24)
Tangible Assets Ratio 0.24*** 0.23*** 0.40*** 0.13* 0.32*** 0.13** 0.24*** 0.19*** 0.40*** 0.23*** 0.21*** 0.20*** 0.20***
(5.06) (4.88) (4.62) (1.82) (5.32) (2.11) (5.06) (3.18) (6.68) (5.06) (4.08) (2.66) (2.71)
Market-to-Book -0.00042 -0.00043 -0.0039** -0.00058 -0.0033** -0.0014** -0.00041 -0.00036 -0.00035 -0.032*** -0.00046 3.0e-07 -0.00012
(-0.94) (-0.93) (-2.12) (-0.45) (-2.22) (-1.97) (-0.90) (-0.73) (-0.90) (-10.4) (-0.92) (0.00086) (-0.28)
Dummy Accounting Standard 0.069*** 0.073*** 0.048 0.18*** 0.088*** 0.082*** 0.075*** 0.081*** 0.079*** 0.091*** 0.079*** 0.076*** 0.084***
(3.95) (4.20) (1.15) (3.84) (3.14) (2.84) (4.34) (3.88) (3.26) (6.07) (4.26) (3.09) (3.52)
Payout Ratio -0.027* -0.030* 0.040 -0.029 -0.044 0.018 -0.026 0.0023 -0.072*** -0.022 0.0031 -0.034* -0.028
(-1.72) (-1.84) (0.62) (-0.58) (-1.09) (0.50) (-1.64) (0.13) (-3.19) (-1.54) (0.19) (-1.84) (-1.49)
Median Industry Leverage 0.55*** 0.57*** 0.21 1.00** -0.64 0.83* 0.55*** 0.40*** 0.48*** 0.35*** 0.057 0.079 0.15
(6.71) (6.83) (0.45) (1.98) (-0.98) (1.78) (6.58) (3.63) (3.38) (4.43) (0.67) (0.49) (0.96)
Expected Inflation Rate 0.045*** 0.049*** 1.93 -0.023 -0.28** 0.12 0.043*** 0.037** 0.022 0.039*** 0.00047 -0.0037 0.011
(3.80) (4.08) (1.15) (-0.078) (-2.07) (1.07) (3.59) (2.48) (1.16) (4.00) (0.040) (-0.19) (0.57)
Constant -0.18* -0.25** -3.33* -0.71 1.07 -0.46 -0.26** -0.17 -0.32** -0.11 0.25** 0.22 0.14
(-1.65) (-2.32) (-1.67) (-1.30) (1.54) (-1.19) (-2.14) (-1.35) (-2.31) (-1.13) (2.33) (1.40) (0.90)
Observations 3855 3855 1624 2231 2428 1431 3859 2248 1611 3859 3303 1624 1794
Number of clusters 589 589 303 286 528 413 591 299 292 591 541 304 335
Adj. R-squared  0.26 0.25 0.17 0.43 0.31 0.41 0.26 0.35 0.31 0.38 0.22 0.30 0.30
Model OLS OLS BE BE BE BE OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Table 10: Market Leverage Robustness Tests
Insider ownership
Note: A detailed description of the variables can be found in table 2. OLS is a pooled OLS regresion model, BE is a "between" effects panel model and FE is a "within"effects panel model. Time and industry dummies are included. The standard errors of the coefficients are corrected for serial
correlation on a firm level and for heteroscedasticity using the Huber-White-Sandwich estimator based on White (1980). T-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance on the 1%-, 5%- and 10%-level respectively.
Sample composition effects Timing effects Non-linear effectsLagged variables
Dummy IPO Dummy IPO IPO 98 - 00 IPO before/after 95 - 00 01 - 06 Firm Size^2 Small firms Large firms Winsorizing (2.5%) 1-year lag No IO <10%
Founder CEO -0.058** -0.066** -0.12*** -0.080*** -0.077** -0.060*** -0.081* -0.070*** -0.061*** -0.043* -0.13** -0.11**
(-2.56) (-2.23) (-2.82) (-3.16) (-2.53) (-2.59) (-1.93) (-2.99) (-2.96) (-1.69) (-2.25) (-2.16)
Dummy High Tech Firm -0.049** -0.043*
(-2.08) (-1.83)
Firm Size ^ 2 -0.00034
(-0.29)
Firm Size [Ln] 0.026*** 0.029*** 0.025** 0.039*** 0.035*** 0.030*** 0.033* 0.036*** 0.028*** 0.037*** 0.026*** 0.038*** 0.037***
(4.67) (5.65) (2.57) (5.77) (5.80) (4.75) (1.81) (5.60) (3.03) (8.10) (4.82) (5.63) (5.63)
Profitability -0.00012 -0.000075 0.00048 -0.71*** 0.000094 -0.17*** -0.00011 -0.81*** -0.00021*** -0.29*** -0.026 -0.31*** -0.19***
(-1.37) (-0.89) (0.80) (-6.02) (0.31) (-4.20) (-1.35) (-7.38) (-3.34) (-6.79) (-1.42) (-3.63) (-3.41)
Outside Blockholders -0.020 -0.0026 -0.072 -0.090** -0.079** -0.017 -0.016 -0.0073 -0.020 -0.013 -0.019 -0.042 -0.033
(-0.80) (-0.11) (-1.40) (-2.51) (-2.50) (-0.52) (-0.67) (-0.29) (-0.54) (-0.63) (-0.74) (-1.20) (-1.01)
Firm Specific Risk 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.11** 0.14** 0.20*** 0.069* 0.14*** 0.29*** 0.067*** 0.19*** 0.11*** 0.080** 0.093**
(4.03) (4.45) (2.19) (2.46) (4.77) (1.69) (4.03) (6.11) (3.36) (6.94) (3.74) (2.48) (2.49)
Firm Age [Ln] 0.0042 0.0086 -0.0040 -0.020* 0.0050 0.012 0.0095 0.0054 0.029** 0.0086 0.0018 -0.0023 -0.0020
(0.52) (1.12) (-0.30) (-1.79) (0.53) (1.34) (1.21) (0.62) (2.32) (1.15) (0.21) (-0.22) (-0.20)
Tangible Assets Ratio 0.22*** 0.23*** 0.43*** 0.15** 0.34*** 0.11 0.22*** 0.20*** 0.38*** 0.22*** 0.19*** 0.18** 0.18**
(4.55) (4.88) (4.90) (2.06) (5.61) (1.64) (4.58) (3.29) (6.30) (4.65) (3.63) (2.26) (2.37)
Market-to-Book -0.00035 -0.00043 -0.0036** -0.00054 -0.0033** -0.00090 -0.00033 -0.00038 -0.00021 -0.032*** -0.00038 0.00011 -0.000028
(-0.75) (-0.93) (-2.01) (-0.41) (-2.21) (-1.15) (-0.69) (-0.65) (-0.53) (-9.62) (-0.72) (0.34) (-0.064)
Dummy Accounting Standard 0.064*** 0.073*** 0.027 0.15*** 0.076*** 0.10*** 0.072*** 0.078*** 0.077*** 0.088*** 0.080*** 0.076*** 0.082***
(3.42) (4.20) (0.63) (3.31) (2.67) (3.38) (3.90) (3.70) (3.08) (5.58) (4.04) (2.96) (3.33)
Payout Ratio -0.026 -0.030* 0.081 -0.088* -0.042 0.0098 -0.024 0.0035 -0.083*** -0.021 0.0024 -0.030 -0.021
(-1.50) (-1.84) (1.27) (-1.70) (-1.05) (0.25) (-1.39) (0.19) (-3.43) (-1.39) (0.14) (-1.54) (-1.10)
Median Industry Leverage 0.57*** 0.57*** 0.26 0.88* -0.30 0.60 0.57*** 0.40*** 0.44*** 0.33*** 0.084 0.065 0.14
(6.77) (6.83) (0.53) (1.82) (-0.48) (1.24) (6.59) (3.51) (3.03) (4.08) (0.94) (0.37) (0.87)
Expected Inflation Rate 0.047*** 0.049*** 0.90 0.026 -0.18 0 0.043*** 0.032** 0.019 0.038*** -0.0012 0.0020 0.015
(3.72) (4.08) (1.23) (0.25) (-1.38) () (3.41) (2.14) (0.95) (3.61) (-0.093) (0.10) (0.79)
Constant -0.18 -0.25** -2.15 -0.48 0.67 -0.32 -0.25* -0.13 -0.28** -0.072 0.23** 0.24 0.15
(-1.58) (-2.32) (-1.24) (-1.06) (1.01) (-0.72) (-1.92) (-1.02) (-2.02) (-0.73) (2.10) (1.41) (0.87)
Observations 3543 3855 1487 2056 2263 1284 3547 2122 1425 3547 3027 1491 1652
Number of clusters 569 569 294 275 513 379 571 289 282 571 518 288 317
Adj. R-squared  0.26 0.25 0.16 0.44 0.31 0.41 0.26 0.36 0.33 0.38 0.23 0.31 0.29
Model OLS OLS BE BE BE BE OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Table 11: Market Leverage Robustness Tests
Insider ownership
Note: A detailed description of the variables can be found in table 2. OLS is a pooled OLS regresion model, BE is a "between" effects panel model and FE is a "within"effects panel model. Time and industry dummies are included. The standard errors of the coefficients are corrected for serial
correlation on a firm level and for heteroscedasticity using the Huber-White-Sandwich estimator based on White (1980). T-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance on the 1%-, 5%- and 10%-level respectively.
Sample composition effects Timing effects Non-linear effects